Philip R Wilkinson, MBE1
Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: The Development of a Common
Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART I: HISTORY OF PEACE-KEEPING DOCTRINE
1.1 During the Cold War
1.2 Post-Cold War
PART II: DOCTRINAL LESSONS LEARNT FROM RECENT PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS
2.1 Bosnia: Refining PK doctrine to create secure
environments
2.2 Somalia: Refining Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine
PART III: ELEMENTS OF CURRENT PK DOCTRINE
3.1 Consent of the Parties
3.2 Impartiality
3.3 Peace Enforcement
3.4 Compatibility with peace-building
3.5 Mission Strategy: a product of civil-military co-operation
CONCLUSION
See elsewhere: Author's Biography
(appendix C)
Executive Summary
During the Cold War, peace-keeping (PK) forces were often
deployed in the aftermath of inter-state conflicts to monitor and facilitate
peace agreements. Generally, judgements concerning the commitment of the parties
to the peace process could be made with some certainty. Such operation were well
within the capability of most European (often Nordic and conscript) forces. The
Nordic nations were more involved in UN PK operations than members of the UN
Security Council and consequently they made the most significant contribution to
PK doctrine at this time, stressing that PK forces should be neutral and
essentially passive observers.
With the end of the Cold War the nature of PK operations
changed. Operations increasingly involved interventions into volatile,
high-risk, intra-state and uncertain environments such as Cambodia, Somalia,
Bosnia and Rwanda, in which a wide-spread humanitarian disaster might be either
the cause or consequence of a conflict. There has been a dynamic development of
PK doctrine in all states with experience of operating in these environments.
The consent of the parties has always been fundamental to the
success of a PK operation. While this is still true, the difficulties associated
with predicting the consent of the parties in volatile circumstances have
demanded that PK forces be prepared for its loss. One of the lessons of UNPROFOR
in Bosnia, for example, was that one should deploy prepared for a Peace
Enforcement operation from the outset where it is uncertain if there is a peace
to keep.
Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine is concerned with the ‘grey
area’ between PK and war. The need for doctrinal development in this area was
demonstrated by the failure of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This
operation moved from one of PK to one of war fighting - bypassing PE completely
- making UNOSOM II party to the conflict and thus unable to conduct any further
PK role.
A new doctrine of impartial PE was designed to ensure that
military forces do not become party to a conflict but use a combination of
coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and
humanitarian agencies can build peace. This doctrine sanctions the impartial
use of force, where actions will be taken against or in support of any
party, depending on its compliance with the operational mandate and principles
enshrined in international humanitarian law. Where forceful activities are
driven purely by principled and clearly defined impartiality, the inevitable
damage to consent is, at least, easier to rebuild. PE therefore requires
considerable military control and restraint, where military commanders balance
short-term advantages gained from the use of enforcement techniques, with the
requirements of the other civilian agencies involved.
Prevailing thinking is that the most cost-effective use of
scarce resources can be achieved through the early development of a multi-agency
strategy or mission plan to decide entry strategy, co-ordinate the incremental
engagement of various agencies, and define lines of operation, objectives, main
effort, exit strategies and co-ordination mechanisms. It is the responsibility
of the head of mission (EU High Representative or UN Special Representative) to
develop and co-ordinate the mission plan, although the military force commander
will make a significant contribution.
While the new doctrinal consensus reflects the broader
political, diplomatic and humanitarian context of Peace Support Operations (PSO),
much that is stated on civil-military co-ordination remains an inspiration which
is not yet reflected in current practice. Within operational theatres and at the
tactical level, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CIMIC) techniques are relatively
well advanced. Within certain nations and at the political and strategic level,
however, government ministries involved in the same PSO often do not plan and
conduct operations jointly and consultations with non-governmental agencies is
often non-existent.
Without policy direction to establish strategic and political
consultation and co-ordination mechanisms within nations and NATO, it is
unlikely that the international community will be able to intervene effectively
to prevent the widespread violation of human rights and help create an
environment in which the causes of conflict can be addressed by civilian
agencies.
PART I: History of Peace-keeping Doctrine
1.1 During the Cold War
The formulation of military doctrine for operations involving
troops, on behalf of the United Nations (UN) has been through several recent
stages of development. In the Cold War era, with the exception of the Korean
War, UN forces were principally involved in what has become known as traditional
peacekeeping operations. While not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter
peacekeeping operations, involving both military observers and peacekeeping
forces, were deployed in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict to monitor and
facilitate a peace agreement. The parties to the conflict were relatively
responsible and judgements concerning their commitment to the peace process
could be made with some certainty. While relatively benign, with the exceptions
of the Lebanon and Congo, such operations were well within the capability of
most European (Nordic) conscript forces.
At that stage, the UK and the other permanent members of the
UN Security Council, did not become directly involved in UN activities - the
1950-53 war in Korea being the one major exception. This was for reasons of both
politically perceived partiality in the ongoing ideological struggle and because
countering Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe dominated military thinking and
doctrine of the major European powers. Also many of the European colonial powers
(up until the 1960s), were also engaged in countering insurgencies in their
various dependencies. At this time, the involvement of troops from the permanent
members of the UN Security Council, in UN Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in
Africa and the Middle East was minimal. As a consequence it was the Nordic
nations who made the most significant doctrinal contribution to peacekeeping
doctrine.
In 1992 Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland produced "Nordic
UN Tactical Manuals, Volumes 1 and 2". Volume 1 focused on principles,
operational matters and issues such as civilian and humanitarian tasks while
Volume 2 went into the detail of peacekeeping techniques. In many areas this
manual was similar to that produced by the British Army in 1988, called Army
Field Manual, Volume V, Part 1 "Peacekeeping Operations". The only discernible
doctrinal difference between the two manuals, was the emphasis the Nordic manual
placed on neutrality while the British manual focused on impartiality. Given the
British Army’s history of counter-insurgency operations it is not surprising
that the UK doctrine favoured a more pro-active approach than the Nordic
preference for neutrality. These differences were, however, reconciled in later
years in response to the different demands of peacekeeping in volatile
intra-state environments.
1.2 Post-Cold War
With the demise of the Cold War, and the greater involvement
of the major powers in UN operations, the development of doctrine for PK, has
been dynamic. In 1993 and 94 the UK and US both developed their own, but
compatible peacekeeping manuals; the UK’s AFM Volume 5, Part 2 "Wider
Peacekeeping" and the US’s FM100-5 "Peace Operations". Both took the basic
peacekeeping philosophy in the Nordic Manuals and attempted to stretch it for
adaptation by full time professional armies, and to make it more robust and
suitable for the more uncertain circumstances in which forces found themselves
more frequently operating. "No use of force" evolved to "minimum use of force",
to "minimum necessary use of force" and the concept of neutrality shifted to one
of impartiality. The key difference being that neutrality suggests observation
and passivity while impartiality requires principled judgements in relation to
the mandate and endorses consequential impartial responses. These doctrinal
developments were based on an ever widening international consensus as
experiences and lessons learned were being shared by an increasing number of
practitioners.
At the same time that nations were developing their new
doctrine for Peace Support Operations(PSO) to meet the challenges of the new
strategic environment of collapsed and collapsing states, NATO was addressing
the same issues. In 1992, at the Athens Conference, Ministers first tried to
develop a strategic directive for PSO and in 1993 the Military Committee
endorsed MC 327 "Military Planning for PSO". MC 327 remained extant until 20
October 1997 when it was replaced by MC 327/1 " Military Concept for PSO". In
the interim, NATO and SHAPE PSO doctrinal statements were tied to the original
MC 327, which itself was tied to the Athens report.
In 1996, due to its increasing role in Bosnia, Sweden decided
to update its doctrine and bring it more in line with other participating
nations. In 1997 they published their first joint manual with the UK, simply
entitled "Peace Support Operations". The Irish army, with its long history of
regular force peace-keeping and in particular the staff at the UN Training
School, Ireland (UNTSI), were also actively, yet informally, engaged in the
debate on doctrinal development.
Elsewhere, doctrinal consensus had been developing over the
previous years within the FINABEL group of nations (France, Italy, Netherlands,
Allemagne, Belgium, Espagne and Luxembourg, but now expanded to include Portugal
and Greece). The FINABEL group of nations, however, perhaps because it is less
institutionally tied to prescribed procedures proved to be a more amenable
environment to exchange ideas and develop doctrinal consensus. In 1995 and 1996,
in a series of enlightened meetings FINABEL developed its own doctrine for PSO
in paper T25R. This was based upon the then current lessons of the major
practitioners and the development of the paper itself greatly helped draw the
burgeoning consensus tighter together.
While T25R was institutionally tied to using the then
endorsed NATO definitions for PSO, definitions with which the nations were
becoming increasingly at odds, it did explore the changed strategic environment
and draw a distinction between PSO and War Fighting. War fighting was seen as
being based upon the defeat of a designated enemy, whereas PE was not. While PE
might require the application of force, combat operations were conducted
impartially against whosoever did not comply with the mandate and were designed
to enforce compliance not necessarily defeat the non-complying party. It also
highlighted the multi-agency nature of PSO when it defined success in PSO as
settlement, not victory, "though settlement is rarely achievable by military
efforts alone".
MC 327/1 drew upon the new conceptual framework in T25R but
was able to redefine the definitions to the general satisfaction of the nations.
The most significant development in MC327/1 was an acknowledgement that military
forces which are only capable of conducting peacekeeping tasks should not be
deployed into a civil war zone and given peacekeeping tasks defined in terms of
"the containment, moderation and or termination of hostilities between or within
states". It is now doctrinally acknowledged that in a conflict zone, where there
may be little or no consent for the operation, such tasks can only be
accomplished by a force configured for PE. However, having deterred or coerced
any opposition, or having enforced peace, the PE force should lower its
operational profile to that of a PK force as soon as judged operationally
viable, but while retaining the ability to escalate as and when necessary.
As the nations were developing their PSO doctrines
bilaterally or collectively in FINABEL and NATO, the WEU was more focused on
operational mission and planning profiles. At the NATO North Atlantic Council
Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 the WEU agreed to examine and develop 20
hypothetical PSO mission planning profiles. These were to use assets and
capabilities which were to be separable but not separate from NATO.
Concurrently, various academic theses have been devised in
parallel with military developments which have made valuable contributions to
the doctrinal debate. These have included, amongst others "second generations
peacekeeping" (1), and "Chapter 6 1/2 Operations" (2). Both these theses also
identified that the strategic environment had changed and that the challenges
posed by intra-state, rather than inter-state crisis, were generally beyond the
competence of traditional peacekeepers and peacekeeping doctrine, as it was then
defined. Both were attempts to fill that doctrinal void or "grey area", as it
increasingly became known, between peacekeeping doctrine and more traditional
war fighting doctrines.
Part II: Doctrinal lessons learnt from recent peace-keeping
operations
With the end of the Cold War the nature of PKOs changed.
Operations increasingly involved interventions into volatile, high risk,
intra-state and uncertain environments - such as Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia,
Rwanda in which a wide spread humanitarian disaster might be either the cause or
consequence of conflict. While the causes of such disasters are complex and have
their origins in a myriad of economic, cultural or ethical factors, their
symptoms are generally defined in terms of human rights abuses or breaches of
International Humanitarian law. To redress the symptoms and address the causes
of such a complex emergency involves the development of a composite response
strategy and doctrine, involving many different military and civilian agencies.
Hence the requirement to expose and discuss the new doctrine with a wide range
of a civilian agencies such as Save the Children, the ICRC Amnesty International
etc. ..As a consequence the new doctrine defines PSO as multi-functional
operations, in acknowledgement that military forces will be but one of many
deployed agencies and possible the one which will be in theatre for the shortest
period of time.
2.1 Bosnia: Refining PK doctrine to create secure environments
While trying not to be overly Bosnia specific, there are key
lessons that can be learned from UNPROFOR. It was in response to an urgent
operational requirement to meet the doctrinal needs of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
in the former Yugoslavia, that the British Army produced AFM "WPK." This manual
was designed specifically to offer guidance to Armed Forces who were operating
in Bosnia and who were attempting to keep the peace in the midst of a civil war
and when there was no peace to keep. In acknowledgement that it was overly
Bosnia specific, and that doctrinal developments in PSO were likely to be
dynamic, AFM "WPK" was issued as an interim edition only. The manual also
acknowledged that it makes little sense to produce a purely national doctrine
for what are self-evidently multinational operations and on top of which involve
a wider group of civilian agencies as well as military forces. In many ways
therefore the UK’s "WPK" set the scene for subsequent doctrinal developments.
Although widely criticised, UNPROFOR achieved as much as
could reasonably be expected, given its limited resources and mandate. While
UNPROFOR has been described in some forum, especially by those who did not
participate in the operation as a failure, that is certainly not the tactical
level view of practitioners. The tactical level view is that UNPROFOR's
perceived failures were not due to a lack of military or civilian competence in
the field but resulted from insufficient political will and commitment from the
international community. In the absence of any coherent policy there was no
tactical alternative but to maintain the operation with the hope that there
would eventually be some form of peace initiative at the political/strategic
level, before the operation lost complete tactical credibility. In the longer
term, military actions are no substitute for political initiatives. As a result,
UNPROFOR could only put off the inevitable day when an operational commander
would have to force the issue at the political level. In mid-1995 UNPROFOR was
eventually confronted by what Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, commander UN
forces in Bosnia described as "the fork in the road" and with the choice of
UNPROFOR either becoming incredible and untenable or switching to peace
enforcement. Wisely, the decision was to chose the enforcement route and as a
consequence provided fresh impetus to the political process.
Measured against the two truisms that you can not keep the
peace unless there is a peace to keep and that you can not fight wars from white
painted vehicles, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is now generally
acknowledged that UNPROFOR was under-resourced in terms of equipment and Rules
of Engagement (ROE), for the achievement of its mission in the circumstances
which prevailed at the time in Bosnia. With that in mind it became necessary to
re-evaluate the doctrine represented in AFM "WPK". In the manual, the term
"wider peacekeeping" was defined as "the wider aspects of peacekeeping
operations carried out with the general consent of the parties but in an
environment that may be highly volatile". The view now is that this definition
stretched traditional peacekeeping doctrine just too far and that PK doctrine,
and PK forces which rely on consent, should not be deployed into a civil war
involving wide spread human rights abuses because the curtailment of these
abuses may risk a general lose of consent which is beyond the ability of the
peace-keepers to manage and hence risk the failure of the mission.
These were the circumstances in which UNPROFOR found itself
operating and which came to a head in mid 1995. The lesson is that the
restriction of human rights abuses, the creation of "safe areas" and other tasks
requiring enforcement can only be accomplished, and should only be attempted by
a force capable of over-matching whatever level of opposition it may be offered.
This has became a recurring lesson in the conduct of operations into
intra-state, failing or failed state where the parties may be ill disciplined,
motivated by power and greed and indistinguishable from the rest of the
population. In these circumstances, any predictions of the "in-theatre" levels
of consent or other conditions may be so problematic as to be worthless. In
which case, the judicious course of action would be to deploy with the necessary
force levels to achieve the mission irrespective of any opposition. That is to
deploy prepared for PE from the outset.
Having generally acknowledged the inadequacies of "WPK" and
the other national doctrines of its era, further development commenced with a
re-evaluation of all previous UN PK and enforcement operations (as then defined
such as the Korean and Gulf Wars), those "small wars" in which many of us had
been involved in our respective draw-down of Empire and other national
experiences such as that of the British Army in support to the civil power in
Northern Ireland. The fundamental question that needed to be answered was, what
was so different about modern operations in complex emergencies - (so called
"grey zones") that merited a new doctrine? The answer to that question, and to
why neither doctrines for PK nor "war fighting" operations were appropriate, was
found in a close examination of the desired end-state of these various
operations. Inevitably the end-state focused on security issues, the creation of
conditions in which civilian agencies could redress the causes of the complex
emergency and the creation of a self-sustaining peace, rather than the defeat of
a designated enemy. Military actions needed to be designed to create a secure
environment and conditions in which others can build a comprehensive and a
self-sustaining peace, rather than a superficial termination of conflict by
military force. This suggested that what was needed was a doctrine to identify
and define a new approach or approaches to PSO, which whilst based on combat
capability, relative to any potential opposition, endorsed the judicious and
impartial use of force but balanced against the long term requirements of
peace-building.
2.2 Somalia: Refining Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine
In the immediate development of military doctrine after the
end of the Cold War, there was a general assumption that PE was synonymous with
war and therefore war fighting doctrine was sufficient for its execution. In
1992, the Gulf War was widely described as a PE operation and when UNISOM II
decided to escalate and target President Aideed, the operation stepped out of
peacekeeping, straight over PE and into war fighting mode, and became a party to
the conflict. The lesson from UNISOM II was the need to define the grey area
between peacekeeping and war so as to offer policy makers a wider range of more
appropriate options. In essence to offer a doctrine of impartial PE in which
military forces do not become a party to the conflict but use a combination of
coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and
humanitarian agencies can build peace.
The lessons of UNOSOM II have been learnt and applied,
especially in US military doctrine. US policy impositions, however, with a
fixation on the need to minimise casualties and mission creep, have inhibited
the application of that doctrine and the conduct of operations. A policy of no
casualties and no mission creep can only serve to stymie the conduct of military
operations, and impede the achievement of the mission. In the longer term, a
policy of no risk taking and no initiative can only detract from the military’s
functional efficacy.
Part III: Elements of current PK doctrine
It is now widely agreed in most military doctrines for PSO
that military activities are designed to create the conditions in which
diplomatic and aid agencies can more effectively address the symptoms and
underlying causes of the problem and that these conditions are best achieved by
employing a combination of coercion and inducements or a "stick and carrot
approach". To do this effectively requires considerable military control and
restraint, and co-ordination with the civilian agencies - they need to tell the
military force what the conditions that need to be created. This clearly
justifies a comprehensive doctrine distinct from war fighting , while
acknowledging that the ability to escalate and use combat remains a prerequisite
in the PE planning. The latest UK, US, French, Swedish and NATO and FINABEL
doctrines all start by defining a conceptual framework for PSO which makes the
distinction between PSO and other more warlike operations, also conducted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, before offering guidance for the conduct of PSO.
As such PE doctrine fills that gap and logically falls into the "grey area"
between PK and war.
3.1 Consent of the Parties
As in the case of previous peacekeeping studies, PSO
considerations were inevitably drawn to the fundamentals of consent,
impartiality and their relationship with the application of force. First as
stated with such clarity in AFM "WPK", peacekeeping is dependent on the consent
of the parties, and the promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental for
success. That view is still extant. However the general view that there is a "rubicon"
of consent - as described in AFM "WPK" - is only perceived as being relevant
from the perspective of a lightly armed PK force. For a combat capable PSO
force, such as I/SFOR, consent is an important consideration but not as a "rubicon"
which can not be easily and frequently re-crossed. From a broader PSO force
perspective, there is no "rubicon" of consent. Indeed the very ambition of a
combat capable PE force should be to lower its operational profile to that of
peacekeeping as soon as is appropriate, while retaining its ability to escalate
as and when required. And these were the very conditions that IFOR found itself
in on deployment to Bosnia in 1995/6. For such a force, a general loss of
consent may be viewed as a tactical reverse, but it should not threaten the
existence of the mission. However, if the conduct of all PSO is designed to
create a self-sustaining peace the promotion of co-operation and consent must
remain a long term requirement.
3.2 Impartiality
The second most significant consideration concerned whether
or not a PE force should be impartial. This was not difficult to ascertain as
the long-term requirement to build consent demands an impartial approach to the
conduct of operations. However, even if all PSO force actions are in support of
an impartial mandate and conducted impartially would they be perceived that way
and did it matter if they are not?
Impartiality is not neutrality, which suggests observation
and passivity. Impartiality requires a set of principles, generally enshrined in
international humanitarian law and/or the mandate, against which the actions of
the belligerent parties can be judged and acted upon. Actions will be taken
against or in support of any party, depending on its compliance or non
compliance with the mandate and not because of who it is. Inevitably positive
actions, whether the delivery of aid or the use of force, whether conducted
impartially or not, will have consequences which penalise or favour one party
more than another. However, PSO activities will inevitably be seen as partial by
the parties at some stage of the operation and the force will be accused of
being so. So long as PSO force activities are driven purely by principled and
clearly defined impartiality, such accusations can be refuted and the subsequent
damage to consent eventually rebuilt.
The only PE operation thus far in which force has been used
impartially, rather than merely threatened, as in the case of I/SFOR was the
French Operation Tourquoise in Rwanda. While French actions were accused of
partiality at the strategic level, the operation was conducted impartially at
the tactical level and tactically the operation was a success. While French
experiences and lessons learned have been remarkable similar to those of the
British and there has been and remains considerable common understanding of the
tactical requirements for success it was not until late 1997 that their
respective doctrines were aligned. This was not a conceptual misunderstanding
but one of language and terminology. What the UK and the other NATO nations
define as PE, the French call Restauration de le Paix, while the French
categorise limited war (Gulf War) as Imposition de la Paix.
3.3 Peace Enforcement
So having restricted PK doctrine to operations where there is
a peace to keep, and having identified that PE is different from war and way, it
has been possible to define PE and offer guidance for its conduct. The doctrinal
approach for PE which is now generally offered is designed to offer commanders
the maximum flexibility in the conduct of operations. In simple terms, it offers
a wide range of enforcement and consent promoting techniques and suggests the
use of enforcement where there is opposition and the use of consent promoting
techniques to maintain consent where it already exists, or to build consent
where it is uncertain. As such the conduct of operations will rely heavily on
information operations and other techniques designed to persuade the warring, or
former warring factions, that their best interests lie in peace rather than a
return to conflict. When and if one of the warring parties fails to comply with
the mandate and it be necessary for the PSO force to use force, the aim would be
to re-enforce the peace rather than the physical defeat of the non-complying
faction. The concept being to apply the most appropriate technique to grasp and
maintain the initiative so as to expand areas of consent at the expense of areas
of opposition and to create the greater operation space in which other agencies
can function.
IFOR’s original concept of operations conformed entirely to
this doctrinal model. While there was a peace to keep - Dayton - the history of
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the painful experiences of UNPROFOR
dictated that IFOR should deploy prepared for PE. But having deployed for the
worst case scenario the level of compliance by the former warring factions with
the terms of the military Annex of Dayton were such, that NATO military
commanders were able very quickly to lower their operational profiles to that
more akin to PK and switch some of their assets to consent promoting techniques
and in support of peace building activities, while retaining the ability to
escalate should that be necessary.
3.4 Compatibility with peace-building
PSO doctrine requires that military commanders balance the
short term advantages which may be gained from the use of enforcement
techniques, with the requirements of the other involved diplomatic and aid
agencies, and the long term demands of peace. In addition, they must ensure that
military efforts to build consent are co-ordinated into a wider multi-agency
"hearts and minds" strategy. Military actions are designed to conclude conflict
by conciliation rather than a short term and superficial termination of the
conflict by force. Assisting the Host Nation establish a stable and
self-sustaining peace, not military victory is the ultimate measure of success
in PSO. Military forces may need to conduct combat operations to enforce
compliance, but the use of force will be constrained by the long-term
requirement to rebuild consent and peace building in general. And the new
doctrine acknowledges that while peace building activities will be supported by
information operations and Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) activities and
projects the prime responsibility for peace building rests with other civilian
agencies.
3-5 Mission Strategy: a product of civil-military co-operation
Prevailing thinking is that the most cost effective use of
scarce resources can be achieved by the early development of a multi-agency
strategy or mission plan. This should draw together the activities of the
various agencies so as to achieve both unity of purpose and effort. This plan
will need to develop an entry strategy to co-ordinate the incremental engagement
of various agencies into the mission, to define lines of operation, objectives,
main effort, exit strategies and co-ordination mechanisms.
It may well be that the main effort does not lie with the
military. In the conduct of PSO, military forces must be prepared to be placed
in support of a civilian agency or a political 'supremo' who may be referred to
as the Head of Mission or possibly High representative. It is the responsibility
of this Head of Mission to develop and co-ordinate the mission plan, not the
military force commander, although he will make a significant input into its
development.
In the context of a UN mandated operation the ‘supremo’ would
be a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) while for an OSCE
mandated operation a EU High Representative. There is not, however, an agreed
institutionalised relationship to co-ordinate the involvement of NATO and the
UN, at either the strategic or operational levels. The process which became
known in Bosnia as the ‘dual key’ process between the UN and NATO was considered
highly unsatisfactory. And of course the involvement of nations in NATO
Non-article V operations, be that PSO or otherwise, rests with the nations. Such
matters are currently being considered and discussed as part of the ongoing NATO
strategic review.
Conclusion
The international which is now represented in many new
national doctrine publications is not, however, conclusive. This must remain a
dynamic doctrinal area because the doctrine that has been developed, in
particular for PE is mainly predictive and apart from Operation Tourquoise, yet
to stand the test of operational reality.
While the new doctrinal consensus reflects the broader
political, diplomatic and humanitarian context of PSO, much that is stated on
co-ordination is as yet mainly an aspiration and not necessarily reflected in
current practice. Within operational theatres and at the tactical level
Civil-Military Co-ordination (CIMIC) doctrine and techniques are being developed
and are relatively well advanced. However, within certain nations, at the
political strategic level, government ministries involved in the same PSO often
do not plan and conduct operations jointly and consultation with non-government
agencies may be non-existent. While NATO doctrine defines success in terms of
creating the conditions in which other civilian, government and non-government
can more ably redress the causes of the crisis, there is often no mechanism for
consultation with these agencies and, therefore, no reliable means of
discovering which conditions need to be created.
Thus, while PK doctrine now acknowledges the need for close
co-operation with civilian agencies to determine the conditions for settlement
and the strategies to achieve this, these requirements are frustrated by
insufficient consultation during policy formulation. Without policy direction to
establish strategic and political consultation and co-ordination mechanisms
within the nations and NATO, it is unlikely that the international community
will make best use of scarce resources, crises will only be partially addressed
and effective intervention to prevent the wide spread violation of human rights
will remain little more than political rhetoric.
