Emma Shitakha
From Conventional Peacekeeping to Multidimensional Field Operations
See elsewhere: Author's Biography
(appendix C)
In 1993, a former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr
Marrack Goulding, put forward the following possible definition of peacekeeping:
“Field operations established by the United Nations with the
consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between
them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of
the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided
voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to
the minimum extent necessary”. 1
He identified several different kinds of peacekeeping operations carried out
by the United Nations, including:
Traditional peacekeeping operations that support peacemaking efforts
by creating conditions on the ground which facilitate political negotiations
elsewhere. Historically, many traditional peacekeeping operations have dealt
with regional conflicts. They were relatively standard operations, small in size
and accounted for only a small share of the United Nations budget. Through an
impartial presence and inter-positioning, the traditional peacekeeping operation
served as an essential channel of communication between conflicting sides,
facilitating mutual understanding, dialogue and co-operation.
For these operations to be successful, it was assumed that they had to be
based on the consent and co-operation of the parties. Consent and co-operation
would, in turn, only be forthcoming if the United Nations remained impartial and
did not try to impose solutions onto the parties, whatever the pressures to take
sides on legal, moral or political grounds. As these operations were based on
the consent of the parties, the use of force in such operations was limited to
self-defence.
Preventive deployment of UN troops before a conflict has actually
begun, at the request of one of the parties and on its territory only. The main
function of the troops would be to monitor and report on developments which
could undermine stability and to provide, by their presence, a psychological
deterrent to potential aggressors. The only example of UN preventive deployment
is the UNPREDEP operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Implementation of a comprehensive settlement already agreed upon by the
parties. These kind of operations involve a wide range of functions
including monitoring or organising of elections, demobilising troops and
verifying respect for human rights.
Protection of the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in conditions
of war. The best example of these operations are Somalia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Post conflict peace building in a country where the institutions of state
have largely collapsed. Under these kind of operations, the United Nations
forces would provide a stable environment and assist a country in rebuilding its
institutions. The functions of the operation would include humanitarian relief,
demobilisation of troops, facilitating national reconciliation and economic
rehabilitation.
At the time that Mr. Goulding identified the various types of UN peacekeeping
operations, the future for multi-faceted peacekeeping looked bright and he
understandably concluded that "the problem now is often not to persuade the
Security Council to set up a peacekeeping operation, but to dissuade it from
rushing into doing so when the conditions for success do not yet exist".2
Today, less than five years later, the reverse is true.
Under the multi-faceted operations entrusted to the United Nations in the
late eighty’s and early ninety’s, the organisation was required to address the
complex and myriad problems of collapsing states, characterised by underlying
ethnic, nationalistic and/or religious tensions, and real and potential
humanitarian disasters. As a result of the complex nature of the conflicts, the
new generation of peacekeeping operations required an unprecedented amount and
variety of material and personnel resources, leading to an explosion in the cost
of peacekeeping which far out-stripped the costs of the regular budget of the
United Nations. For the first time, the operations contained a significant
civilian component, including large numbers of civilian police monitors.
The case of the UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated how,
in complex situations, operations based on the traditional peacekeeping
principles of consent and impartiality ran into serious difficulties. The
apparent lack of a clear command and control structure within the different
warring factions and the proliferation of local “Mafia” undermined the
operational basis of the consent principle and made it difficult, if not
impossible, to implement the mandate in a consistent manner. The value of being
impartial was also questioned when, by being so, ran the risk of freezing an
existing imbalance of power or encouraging the stronger side to take advantage
of its privileged militarily stronger position.
The minimum use of force was also questioned when widespread and seemingly
irrational violence against civilians, captured vividly by the media, outraged
public opinion and generated an emotionally propelled desire to “do something”.
The increasing perception that such conflicts required a new set of principles
in which there should be less reliance on impartiality, consent and the minimum
use of force, and more recourse to the robust use of force in implementing the
mandate, led to an endless debate on the use of force that plagued the UNPROFOR
operation in 1994 and most of 1995.
This debate was in a large part fuelled by the creation, and subsequent
tragic failure, of the safe areas concept and, unfortunately, coincided with the
absence of a coherent framework for peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a
result, it failed to adequately take into account the question of what the
ultimate goal of using force in a peacekeeping operation should be or that the
use of force alone could not nullify the underlying psychological, ideological
and other causes of the conflict, nor change their perceptions and stereotypes.
The focus on military intervention rather than on adopting policies to build and
sustain peace had the potential of haphazardly pushing the mission into taking
sides without necessarily promoting the goals of the peacekeeping operation.
While the debate on the use of force in a peacekeeping operation was not the
only issue to eclipse UNPROFOR’s fundamental success in stabilising the
situation and mitigating the worst effects of what had already happened and what
was happening in Bosnia, it did overshadow those other important elements that
are necessary for the success of any peacekeeping operation. Namely, the firm
and sustained political will of the international community, the co-operation of
the parties, a clear and consistent mandate and the provision of the necessary
resources to implement that mandate. One could also add to the list the absence
of an ongoing war. All of these factors were missing in Bosnia.
Peacekeeping efforts within Croatia and Bosnia in the aftermath of the
UNPROFOR operation have, I believe, taught us some important lessons about our
past performance and prospects for future multi-faceted peacekeeping operations.
In Bosnia, the international community has chosen to adopt a different approach
to resolving the conflict in that country.
The Dayton Agreement establishes a distribution of labour among different
actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Military enforcement of the agreement has been
carried out by IFOR and its successor SFOR. However, it should be recalled that
before the transfer of responsibility to IFOR, UNPROFOR implemented and
monitored the initial cease-fire in the country. This is a clear demonstration
that given the co-operation of the parties and the full backing of the
international community, the United Nations was capable of carrying out its
mandate.
The elections and human rights issues in the Dayton Agreement were assigned
to the OSCE and the Council of Europe while refugee and displaced persons issues
remained with the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Annex 11 of the
Agreement, which deals with the policing responsibilities, was not assigned to
any organisation. The United Nations assumed this responsibility by default - no
one at Dayton was interested in taking on the task.
Early in the new operation in Bosnia, it was clear that the important civil
affairs activities carried out by UNPROFOR could not be replicated by another
organisation. Many civil affairs officers in the country possessed vital
institutional knowledge. It was decided, therefore, to place both the police
element (the IPTF) and the civil affairs element under the authority of the
Secretary-General through a United Nations co-ordinator of the UN Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The co-ordinator, who was also the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, would be the co-ordinating link between
the activities of the United Nations elements in Bosnia and the High
Representative.
The role assigned to the United Nations in Bosnia has, overall, highlighted
the strengths of the organisation. The IPTF is a good example of the United
Nation’s ability to run unarmed or lightly armed missions with the consent of
the parties. The essentially non-threatening United Nations police force
encourages co-operation. This has been necessary and important for the training
and restructuring activities carried out by the IPTF. These are not activities
that can be carried out at gunpoint but must, if they are to succeed, be done on
a voluntary basis.
The civil affairs element represents the organisation’s strong ability to
make available for operations, at short notice, high quality political staff.
Many other organisations have great difficulties in recruiting staff, especially
when they have to rely completely on seconded staff.
The NATO-led military presence in Bosnia has provided the UNMIBH mission,
particularly the IPTF, with a robust environment in which to carry out its
mandate aggressively. IPTF has been able to successfully implement a check-point
policy and undertake weapons inspections because of the credible back-up force
that SFOR provides. To take away the SFOR element would affect the ability of
the mission to function at the limit of its mandate. It would also affect the
ability of all other international organisations in Bosnia to implement their
mandates.
One of the potential problems that could result from the wide division of
labour in Bosnia is that of co-ordination. The High Representative has the
responsibility for co-ordination but lacks the means necessary to carry it out
effectively. SFOR does not fall under the co-ordination authority of the High
Representative and the United Nations mission and agencies fall under the
authority of the Secretary-General. Given the strongly guarded independence of
actors in the area, the effective co-ordination that the High Representative has
been able to achieve has been remarkable.
There is also a lack of unity in the field of human rights monitoring in
Bosnia. There are a large number of human rights entities working in Bosnia,
including the United Nations and its agencies, and inter-governmental and
non-governmental organisations. All of these have their own mandate, priorities
and reporting channels. In such an environment, consensus on human rights issues
can be difficult to achieve, particularly as the Dayton Agreement has failed to
identify a lead organisation to co-ordinate human rights activities.
However, with regard to the strong human rights mandate given to the IPTF in
Annex 11, the United Nations has done an admirable job in implementing its
mandate. It has initiated a certification process for the police, which is
intended to screen applicants for criminal activities and human rights abuses,
and has energetically investigated human rights violations committed by local
police. As a result of this action, the overall level of human rights violations
by police, the most common human rights abuses in Bosnia, has gone down.
In general, the restructuring work carried out by the IPTF goes to the core
of the power structure of the old nationalist regimes in Bosnia. The police are
gradually being transformed from an organ which protected the state, or the
party they identified with, to an instrument of service to citizens. The United
Nations’ Mission in Bosnia has underlined that the democratisation dynamic that
has started must be maintained and become part of a broader strategy of change
in Bosnia if progress is to be sustained. A broader strategy of change means
that the IPTF removal of illegal police check-points must be part of a general
freedom of movement policy which, in turn, must be encouraged by economic
revitalisation and incentives for displaced persons and refugees to return to
their homes. People need to be given a reason to want to cross the inter-entity
boundary line - the availability of jobs, housing and other opportunities will,
hopefully, provide them with that reason. Refugee returns are also important in
a broader and integrated strategy if the risk of ending up with a multi-ethnic
police force in an ethnically pure village is to be avoided.
Another example of the need for a broader strategy is in police reform. For
reform to be effective and long-lasting, it must be part of a general reform of
the judicial and penal systems. Experience has shown that monitoring and
training of the local police is not enough if the practical work of a
peacekeeping mission is to be transformed into the practical application of
accepted human rights principles and their long-term awareness.
Turning to the post-UNPROFOR United Nations role in Croatia, which was based
on the 12 November 1995 Basic Agreement on the peaceful reintegration of the
region of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia, as with the IPTF in Bosnia, the United
Nations assumption of direct responsibility for Eastern Slavonia was in some
ways by default. Again, few were willing to take on a task which many believed
was doomed to failure.
In the early days, when considering how best to implement the Basic
Agreement, the United Nations realised that while it would be possible to
distribute various civilian tasks outlined in the Basic Agreement to other
organisations, this ran the risk of reducing the transitional administration to
the role of a supervisory co-ordinating body rather than an executive authority.
It was also clear that unless the military force was superior to those in UNCRO
and UNPROFOR, and had a clear enforcement role with regard to demilitarising the
region, it would fall prey to the accusations of inadequacy that had plagued the
UNCRO and UNPROFOR missions.
The UNTAES mission ended on 15 January. It is being hailed as one of the
greatest successes of the United Nations. Although it is too early to say
whether its success is sustainable, many believed that, given the unprecedented
international commitment to Bosnia, that conflict had more of a chance of
success than the mission in Eastern Slavonia. The preliminary lessons that can
already be learned from the UNTAES experience are the following:
First, that the consistent and unified support of the
Security Council contributed greatly to the success of the mission. The support
of the United States in particular, and the work of two outstanding Transitional
Administrators, were also important factors in the mission’s success. As a
result of this strong support, and in cases of non-compliance by the Croatians,
it was possible for the international community to put pressure on them in an
effective manner. For example, the United States blocked financial loans for
Croatia in the IMF and the World Bank.
Second, a well conceived strategy in implementing a mandate is essential. The
reintegration of the local police was recognised as the single most important
task of the UNTAES mission if a sustainable reintegration of the population was
to be achieved. The gradual draw-down of the military component of UNTAES and a
shift of focus to strengthening and making more visible the Transitional Police
Force allowed the population to build trust and confidence in the authority of
the police and, by extension, the authority of the Croatian government.
Third, a strong and credible military force is essential to ensure compliance
by the parties. Although the UNTAES military force was only 5000 strong, it
possessed credible means of force and made it clear that it was prepared to use
it against any violating party. The NATO backup provided the means to escalate
that force if necessary.
Fourth, a clear exit-strategy, linked to mutually reinforcing and
interdependent benchmarks allows for a smooth and successful downsizing of a
mission.
Fifth, a good combination of carrots and sticks can encourage compliance by
the parties. At the start of the mission, sticks were an effective instrument of
coercion. Once the military component began to down-size in the second year of
the mission, UNTAES lost its credibility to enforce compliance. Carrots became
the most effective means of encouraging the parties to co-operate.
Sixth, it is necessary, in some cases, to put in place appropriate successor
arrangements (the United Nations civilian police support group, the OSCE mission
in Croatia) as early as possible. A continued international monitoring presence
provides reassurance to the local population that their human rights will be
protected.
Seventh, a unified civilian and military structure is generally conducive to
success. UNTAES was an integrated mission with a short and responsive chain of
command. All the activities of the mission were co-ordinated by the Transitional
Administrator and fell under his overall authority.
Eighth, the mandate given to UNTAES was clear and precise and the resources
provided to the mission were commensurate with its tasks. UNTAES demonstrated
that, when the United Nations is given a clear mandate and the necessary
resources to carry it out, and when that mandate and those resources are
supported by a strong political resolve and a united Security Council, then the
United Nations can effectively carry out multidimensional peacekeeping
operations.
Recent experiences in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Eastern Slavonia,
have demonstrated that the United Nations can indeed play an important role in
multidimensional operations given the right conditions and resources. However,
peacekeeping has entered a new phase in which future operations will be asked to
achieve even more ambitious objectives. Their goal is not just stability in
their area of deployment but transformation of post-conflict societies, and the
creation of working democracies where none existed before. In this context, the
role of United Nations civilian police, especially in human rights monitoring,
has acquired a new importance.
There is emerging consensus within the United Nations and among Member States
that the role of the police not only contributes to short-term maintenance of
law and order and respect for human rights but also promotes longer term
stability by fostering a climate where the influence of the military is
diminished and the emergence of a civil leadership is encouraged. This
development can reshape the internal dynamics of a post-conflict society in such
a way as to significantly strengthen the foundations for lasting peace.
In view of experience and of likely civilian police requirements in future
peacekeeping missions, the United Nations is currently considering two broad
areas which could benefit from further analysis. The first is how to overcome an
acute shortage of police personnel who are trained in accordance with common
standards and who are readily available for service with the UN and the second
is to gain a greater common understanding on the roles and potential roles of a
police presence, both before and after the military component of a peacekeeping
operation withdraws.
General observations/recommendations:
- For any peacekeeping, human rights or other mission to be effective, the
link between personnel on the ground and political negotiators must be
maintained. The sharing of information at all levels is critical in order to
avoid a policy vacuum within which the parties can pursue their maximalist
goals.
- The prevention of a conflict is clearly more cost effective in human lives
and resources. Preventive deployment can deter underlying tensions between and
within states from erupting into open conflict. However, in order to prevent a
conflict, forces must deploy sufficiently early that latent tensions do not
have the opportunity to fester and explode into violence. Unfortunately, if a
conflict does not appear imminent, it is difficult to justify using resources
that may appear better spent elsewhere.
- The training of peacekeeping personnel in human rights, particularly
civilian police, is essential if we are to make a lasting impact in any peace
process. However, rotations of police monitors and other personnel must allow
them sufficient time to develop minimum country and area specific expertise to
operate effectively.
- Whatever the short-term pressures to relinquish UN responsibilities in
peacekeeping to regional organisations or coalitions of member-states, the
UN’s perceived impartiality and objectivity will ensure that it continues to
play a role as a dependable facilitator of peace in conflict situations. The
organisation and its many agencies can make a pivotal contribution to
multifaceted operations by adopting an integrated approach in addressing the
complex problems of today's crisis situations.
