University of Essex

GV307-6-AU-CO:
Political Economy I

The details

Year: 2023/24

Department: Government

Campus: Colchester Campus

Term: Autumn

Level: Undergraduate: Level 6

Status: Current

Start date: Thursday 05 October 2023

End date: Friday 15 December 2023

Credits: 15

Last updated: 06 June 2023

Requisites for this module

Pre-requisites: (none)

Co-requisites: (none)

Pre and / or co-requisites: (none)

Prohibited modules: EC831

Key module (requisite for): (none)

Key module for

BSC LL14 Economics and Politics (Including Foundation Year),
BSC LL2F Economics and Politics,
BSC LL3F Economics and Politics (Including Year Abroad),
BSC LL4F Economics and Politics (Including Placement Year),
BA L900 International Development,
BA L901 International Development (Including Year Abroad),
BA L902 International Development (Including Placement Year),
BA L921 International Development (Including Foundation Year),
BA L212 Global Politics,
BA L213 Global Politics (including Placement Year),
BA L214 Global Politics (including Year Abroad)

Module description

This module is about modern political economy, meaning analytical approaches to study how economic and political incentives interact to create constraints and opportunities that shape larger political and economic behaviour and outcomes. The module introduces students to the use of rigorous logic and evidence in order to understand classical political economy issues as well as to address contemporary policy issues in both domestic and international dimensions. Some of the substantive topics that will be covered include: the origins of the state and state capacity, the political determinants of economic development and inequality, and democracy and redistribution.

This module requires knowledge of essay writing in political science. Students are assumed to have some familiarity with elementary mathematical concepts (e.g., sets, functions, algebra, basic probability theory). The module does not require knowledge of calculus.

Module aims

The aims of this module are:

To introduce the students to key issues and research examples within political economy.

Module learning outcomes

By the end of this module, students will:

Be aware of the main theories and debates on the political determinants of economic development.

Understand how politics—in particular, political institutions and leaders—shape economic outcomes, and how the economy may prompt political change, such as regime or institutional change.

Understand quantitative empirical evidence from research in political economy.

Be able to analyse and discuss policy issues using methods and approaches from political economy.

Module information

No additional information available.

Learning and teaching methods

The module will be delivered via:

A two hour weekly seminar.

Bibliography

Timothy Besley (2007) ‘The New Political Economy’, The Economic Journal, 117(524), pp. F570–F587. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4625573.
Rubinstein, A. (2012) Economic Fables. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjswm.
Shepsle, K.A. (2010b) Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton. Available at: https://app.kortext.com/Shibboleth.sso/Login?entityID=https://idp0.essex.ac.uk/shibboleth&target=https://app.kortext.com/borrow/1129707.
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, M. (1993) ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87(3), pp. 567–576. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736.
Sánchez de la Sierra, R. (2020) ‘On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo’, Journal of Political Economy, 128(1), pp. 32–74. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/703989.
Myerson, R.B. (2008) ‘The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State’, American Political Science Review, 102(1), pp. 125–139. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080076.
Blaydes, L. and Chaney, E. (2013) ‘The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE’, American Political Science Review, 107(1), pp. 16–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000561.
Levi, M. (1981) ‘The Predatory Theory of Rule’, Politics & Society, 10(4), pp. 431–465. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/003232928101000403.
Queralt, D. (2019) ‘War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run’, International Organization, 73(4), pp. 713–753. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000250.
Garfias, F. (2018) ‘Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Mexico’, American Political Science Review, 112(2), pp. 339–357. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000715.
Blaydes, L. and Paik, C. (2016) ‘The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe’, International Organization, 70(3), pp. 551–586. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000096.
Beramendi, P., Dincecco, M. and Rogers, M. (2019) ‘Intra-Elite Competition and Long-Run Fiscal Development’, The Journal of Politics, 81(1), pp. 49–65. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/700273.
Paglayan, A.S. (2022) ‘Education or Indoctrination? The Violent Origins of Public School Systems in an Era of State-Building’, American Political Science Review, pp. 1–16. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000247.
Ch, R. et al. (2018) ‘Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombia’, American Political Science Review, 112(4), pp. 996–1015. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000333.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2001) ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91(5), pp. 1369–1401. Available at: https://search-ebscohost-com.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=5776485&site=ehost-live&authtype=sso&custid=s9814295.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2002) ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp. 1231–1294. Available at: https://search-ebscohost-com.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=8712392&site=ehost-live&authtype=sso&custid=s9814295.
Banerjee, A. and Iyer, L. (2005) ‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’, American Economic Review, 95(4), pp. 1190–1213. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711.
Guardado, J. (2018) ‘Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru’, American Political Science Review, 112(4), pp. 971–995. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800045X.
Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2005) ‘Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), pp. 835–864. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.835.
Carreri, M. (2021) ‘Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors’, The Journal of Politics, 83(4), pp. 1229–1245. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/715062.
Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard (1981) ‘A Rational Theory of the Size of Government’, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 914–927. Available at: https://www-journals-uchicago-edu.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1086/261013.
Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006) ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others’, American Political Science Review, 100(2), pp. 165–181. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062083.
Mares, I. and Queralt, D. (2015) ‘The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation’, Comparative Political Studies, 48(14), pp. 1974–2009. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015592646.
Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2014) ‘Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution’, British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), pp. 575–603. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000124.
Hollenbach, F.M. and Silva, T.N. (2019) ‘Fiscal Capacity and Inequality: Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities’, The Journal of Politics, 81(4), pp. 1434–1445. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/704595.
Suryanarayan, P. and White, S. (2021) ‘Slavery, Reconstruction, and Bureaucratic Capacity in the American South’, American Political Science Review, 115(2), pp. 568–584. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000933.

The above list is indicative of the essential reading for the course.
The library makes provision for all reading list items, with digital provision where possible, and these resources are shared between students.
Further reading can be obtained from this module's reading list.

Assessment items, weightings and deadlines

Coursework / exam	Description	Coursework weighting
Coursework	Assignment 1	33%
Coursework	Assignment 2	33%
Coursework	Assignment 3	34%

Exam format definitions

Remote, open book: Your exam will take place remotely via an online learning platform. You may refer to any physical or electronic materials during the exam.
In-person, open book: Your exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer to any physical materials such as paper study notes or a textbook during the exam. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
In-person, open book (restricted): The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer only to specific physical materials such as a named textbook during the exam. Permitted materials will be specified by your department. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
In-person, closed book: The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may not refer to any physical materials or electronic devices during the exam. There may be times when a paper dictionary, for example, may be permitted in an otherwise closed book exam. Any exceptions will be specified by your department.

Your department will provide further guidance before your exams.

Overall assessment

Coursework	Exam
100%	0%

Reassessment

Coursework	Exam
100%	0%

Module supervisor and teaching staff

Supervisor:

Teaching staff:

Contact details:

Availability

Available to incoming Essex Abroad / Exchange students: No

Available to Outside Option: No

Available to Audit: No

External examiner

Name: Dr Stefano Pagliari

Institution: City, University of London

Academic role: Senior Lecturer in International Politics

Resources

Teaching materials: Available via Moodle

Lecture recording: Of 20 hours, 20 (100%) hours available to students:
0 hours not recorded due to service coverage or fault;
0 hours not recorded due to opt-out by lecturer(s), module, or event type.

Further information

Department website: Government

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Module Directory

GV307-6-AU-CO:Political Economy I