GV307-6-AU-CO:
Comparative Political Economy
2025/26
Government
Colchester Campus
Autumn
Undergraduate: Level 6
Current
Thursday 02 October 2025
Friday 12 December 2025
15
11 August 2025
Requisites for this module
(none)
(none)
(none)
EC831
(none)
BSC LL14 Economics and Politics (Including Foundation Year),
BSC LL2F Economics and Politics,
BSC LL3F Economics and Politics (Including Year Abroad),
BSC LL4F Economics and Politics (Including Placement Year),
BA L900 International Development,
BA L212 Global Politics,
BA L213 Global Politics (including Placement Year),
BA L214 Global Politics (including Year Abroad)
This module is about modern political economy, meaning analytical approaches to study how economic and political incentives interact to create constraints and opportunities that shape larger political and economic behaviour and outcomes. The module introduces students to the use of rigorous logic and evidence in order to understand classical political economy issues as well as to address contemporary policy issues.
The aims of this module are:
- To introduce the students to key issues and research examples within political economy.
By the end of this module, students will:
- Be aware of the main theories and debates on the political determinants of economic development.
- Understand how politics—in particular, political institutions and leaders—shape economic outcomes, and how the economy may prompt political change, such as regime or institutional change.
- Understand quantitative empirical evidence from research in political economy.
- Be able to analyse and discuss policy issues using methods and approaches from political economy.
Students in this module will have opportunities to improve the following employability-related skills:
- Demonstrate familiarity and competence with data sources and methods commonly used in political science and political economy.
- Develop a plan to answer a research question in a systematic and/or intellectually rigorous manner.
- Practice small-group deliberation
- Publicly present/discuss research and respond to feedback.
No additional information available.
The module will be delivered via:
- A two hour weekly seminar.
-
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2003) The logic of political survival. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
-
Ostrom, Elinor (no date) 'Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms',
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp. 137–158. Available at:
https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1257/jep.14.3.137.
-
Milgrom, P.R., North, D.C. and Weingast*, B.R. (1990) 'The Role, of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champaign Fairs',
Economics & Politics, 2(1), pp. 1–23. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x.
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Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2006) Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Carles Boix (2003) 'Endogenous Democratization',
World Politics, 55(4), pp. 517–549. Available at:
https://muse-jhu-edu.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/article/49855.
-
Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson (1199) 'Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective',
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), pp. 1167–1199. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/2586922?sid=primo.
-
Svolik, M.W. (2013) 'Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy',
American Journal of Political Science, 57(3), pp. 685–702. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12005.
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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith (2009) 'Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change',
Comparative Political Studies, 42(2). Available at:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/compls42&id=162.
-
Meltzer, Allan H. and Richard, Scott F. (1981) 'A Rational Theory of the Size of Government',
Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 914–927. Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830813.
-
Alesina, Alberto (no date) 'Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution',
American Economic Review, 108(2), pp. 521–54. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26527913.
-
Hacker, J.S. and Pierson, P. (2010) 'Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States',
Politics & Society, 38(2), pp. 152–204. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329210365042.
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Alisha C. Holland (no date) 'Diminished Expectations Redistributive Preferences in Truncated Welfare States',
World Politics, 70(4). Available at:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/wpot70&id=593.
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Ferejohn, John (1986) 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control',
Public Choice, 50(1/3), pp. 5–25. Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024650.
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MARK ANDREAS KAYSER, MICHAEL PERESS (2012) 'Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison',
The American Political Science Review, 106(3), pp. 661–684. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/23275439?sid=primo.
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Stantcheva, S. (2021) 'Understanding Tax Policy: How do People Reason?',
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(4), pp. 2309–2369. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab033.
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Ansolabehere, S., Meredith, M. and Snowberg, E. (2014) 'Mecro-Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy',
Economics & Politics, 26(3), pp. 380–410. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12040.
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Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman (1994) 'Protection for Sale',
American Economic Review, 84(4), pp. 833–850. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/2118033.
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Maria Popova (2010) 'Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence From Russia and Ukraine',
Comparative Political Studies, 43(10). Available at:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/compls43&id=1172.
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Strong, C. and Yayi, C.L. (2023) 'The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa',
International Review of Economics & Finance, 85, pp. 603–620. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.02.016.
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Mattozzi, A. and Merlo, A. (2008) 'Political careers or career politicians?',
Journal of Public Economics, 92(3–4), pp. 597–608. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.10.006.
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Baerg, N.R., Gray, J. and Willisch, J. (2021) 'Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation: The Political Origins of Central Bank Independence',
Comparative Political Studies, 54(6), pp. 956–988. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957679.
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Cesi Cruz, Julien Labonne, Pablo Querubín (3037) 'Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines',
American Economic Review, 107(10), pp. 3006–3037. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/44871776?sid=primo.
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Esarey, J. and Schwindt-Bayer, L.A. (2018) 'Women's Representation, Accountability and Corruption in Democracies',
British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), pp. 659–690. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000478.
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Persson, A., Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2013) 'Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem',
Governance, 26(3), pp. 449–471. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x.
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Figueroa, V. (2021) 'Political Corruption Cycles: High-Frequency Evidence from Argentina's Notebooks Scandal',
Comparative Political Studies, 54(3–4), pp. 482–517. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020938102.
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Lant Pritchett (1997) 'Divergence, Big Time',
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3), pp. 3–17. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/2138181?sid=primo.
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Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Vadym Volosovych (2008) 'Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation',
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), pp. 347–368. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/40043150?sid=primo.
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Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson (1401) 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation',
American Economic Review, 91(5), pp. 1369–1401. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/2677930?sid=primo.
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Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2005) 'Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth', in
Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier, pp. 385–472. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3.
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Stelios Michalopoulos, Elias Papaioannou (2014) 'National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa',
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), pp. 151–214. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/26372546?sid=primo.
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Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer (2004) 'Do Institutions Cause Growth?',
Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), pp. 271–303. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/40215873?sid=primo.
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Edward Miguel (2004) 'Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania',
World Politics, 56(3), pp. 327–362. Available at:
https://www-jstor-org.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/stable/25054263?sid=primo.
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TAJIMA, Y., SAMPHANTHARAK, K. and OSTWALD, K. (2018) 'Ethnic Segregation and Public Goods: Evidence from Indonesia',
American Political Science Review, 112(3), pp. 637–653. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000138.
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CRUZ, C., LABONNE, J. and QUERUBÍN, P. (2020) 'Social Network Structures and the Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the Philippines',
American Political Science Review, 114(2), pp. 486–501. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000789.
The above list is indicative of the essential reading for the course.
The library makes provision for all reading list items, with digital provision where possible, and these resources are shared between students.
Further reading can be obtained from this module's
reading list.
Assessment items, weightings and deadlines
| Coursework / exam |
Description |
Deadline |
Coursework weighting |
| Coursework |
Assignment 1 |
|
33% |
| Coursework |
Assignment 2 |
|
33% |
| Coursework |
Assignment 3 |
|
34% |
Exam format definitions
- Remote, open book: Your exam will take place remotely via an online learning platform. You may refer to any physical or electronic materials during the exam.
- In-person, open book: Your exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer to any physical materials such as paper study notes or a textbook during the exam. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, open book (restricted): The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer only to specific physical materials such as a named textbook during the exam. Permitted materials will be specified by your department. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, closed book: The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may not refer to any physical materials or electronic devices during the exam. There may be times when a paper dictionary,
for example, may be permitted in an otherwise closed book exam. Any exceptions will be specified by your department.
Your department will provide further guidance before your exams.
Overall assessment
Reassessment
Module supervisor and teaching staff
Dr Martin Steinwand, email: martin.steinwand@essex.ac.uk.
Dr Martin Steinwand
Module Supervisor: Dr Martin Steinwand, martin.steinwand@essex.ac.uk / Student Administrator: govquery@essex.ac.uk
No
Yes
No
Dr Stefano Pagliari
City, University of London
Senior Lecturer in International Politics
Available via Moodle
Of 2 hours, 2 (100%) hours available to students:
0 hours not recorded due to service coverage or fault;
0 hours not recorded due to opt-out by lecturer(s), module, or event type.
Government
* Please note: due to differing publication schedules, items marked with an asterisk (*) base their information upon the previous academic year.
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