GV307-6-FY-CO:
Political Economy

The details
2019/20
Government
Colchester Campus
Full Year
Undergraduate: Level 6
Current
Thursday 03 October 2019
Friday 26 June 2020
30
11 May 2020

 

Requisites for this module
(none)
(none)
(none)
EC831

 

(none)

Key module for

BA L900 International Development,
BA L901 International Development (Including Year Abroad),
BA L902 International Development (Including Placement Year)

Module description

This module is about modern political economy, meaning analytical approaches to study how economic and political incentives interact to create constraints and opportunities that shape larger political and economic behaviour and outcomes. The module introduces students to the use of rigorous logic and evidence in order to understand classical political economy issues as well as to address contemporary policy issues in both domestic and international dimensions.

PRE-REQUISITES
This module requires knowledge of essay writing in political science. It also requires knowledge of applied statistics (especially regression analysis), algebra, analytic geometry, and differential calculus, all at GCSE level.

Module aims

To introduce the students to key issues and research examples within political economy.

Module learning outcomes

Know and discuss key issues in political economy.
Understand and solve formal political economy models.
Understand quantitative empirical evidence from research in political economy.
Analyze and discuss policy issues using methods and approaches from political economy

Module information

No additional information available.

Learning and teaching methods

No information available.

Bibliography

  • Jessee, Stephen A. (2009) 'Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 103 (1) , pp.59-81
  • Michael L. Ross. (2008) 'Oil, Islam, and Women', in American Political Science Review. vol. 102 (1) , pp.107-123
  • Brandice Canes-Wrone; Jee-Kwang Park. (2012) 'Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 106 (1) , pp.103-122
  • Savun, Burcu; Tirone, Daniel C. (2011) 'Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?', in American Journal of Political Science. vol. 55 (2) , pp.233-246
  • James Raymond Vreeland. (2007) The International Monetary Fund: politics of conditional lending, London: Routledge. vol. Routledge global institutions
  • Sanford C. Gordon; Gregory Huber. (2007) 'The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior', in Quarterly Journal of Political Science. vol. 2 (2) , pp.107-138
  • Torben Iversen; David Soskice. (2006) 'Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 100 (2) , pp.165-181
  • Mark Andreas Kayser. (2005) 'Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 99 (1) , pp.17-27
  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair. (2011-06-09) 'How Tyrants Endure', in The New York Times.
  • Wellhausen, Rachel L. (2015-03) 'Investor–State Disputes', in Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 59 (2) , pp.239-261
  • Aidt, Toke S.; Veiga, Francisco José; Veiga, Linda Gonçalves. (2011) 'Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model', in Public Choice. vol. 148 (1) , pp.21-44
  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair. (2007) 'Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 51 (2) , pp.251-284
  • Rajan, Raghuram G. (2008) 'The Future of the IMF and the World Bank', in The American Economic Review. vol. 98 (2) , pp.110-115
  • Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Alastair Smith. (2011) The dictator's handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics, New York: PublicAffairs.
  • Alejandro Quiroz Flores. (2016) Ministerial survival during political and cabinet change: foreign affairs, diplomacy and war, New York, NY: Routledge. vol. Routledge research on social and political elites
  • Olson, Mancur. (1993-09) 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', in American Political Science Review. vol. 87 (3) , pp.567-576
  • J. S. Ahlquist. (2007) 'Book Review: Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press', in Comparative Political Studies. vol. 40 (8) , pp.1026-1029
  • McGillivray, Fiona. (c2004) Privileging industry: the comparative politics of trade and industrial policy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
  • de Mesquita, B. B.; Smith, A. (2013-06-01) 'Aid: Blame It All on "Easy Money"', in Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 57 (3) , pp.524-537
  • Miller, Gary J. (2005) 'The Political Evolution Principal-Agent Models', in Annual Review of Political Science. vol. 8 (1) , pp.203-225
  • Bochsler, Daniel. (2010) 'The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern', in Public Choice. vol. 144 (1) , pp.119-131
  • Andersen, Jørgen J.; Ross, Michael L. (2014-06) 'The Big Oil Change', in Comparative Political Studies. vol. 47 (7) , pp.993-1021
  • Dewan, Torun; Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2011-06-15) 'Political Economy Models of Elections', in Annual Review of Political Science. vol. 14 (1) , pp.311-330
  • Potthoff, Richard F. (2011) 'Condorcet Polling', in Public Choice. vol. 148 (1) , pp.67-86
  • Ronald Rogowski; Mark Andreas Kayser. (2002) 'Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries', in American Journal of Political Science. vol. 46 (3) , pp.526-539
  • Myerson, Roger B. (2008) 'The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 102 (1) , pp.125-139
  • B. B. de Mesquita; A. Smith. (2008) 'Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change', in Comparative Political Studies. vol. 42 (2) , pp.167-197
  • Lektzian, David; Souva, Mark. (2003) 'The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions', in Journal of Peace Research. vol. 40 (6) , pp.641-660
  • Olken, Benjamin A. (2007) 'Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia', in Journal of Political Economy: The University of Chicago Press. vol. 115 (2) , pp.200-249
  • Beth A. Simmons. (1998) 'Compliance with International Agreements', in Annual Review of Political Science. vol. 1 (1) , pp.75-93
  • Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W. (1993) 'Corruption', in The Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. 108 (3) , pp.599-617
  • Drezner, Daniel W. (2003) 'The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion', in International Organization. vol. 57 (3) , pp.643-659
  • Smith, Alastair. (2005) 'Why International Organizations Will Continue to Fail Their Development Goals', in Perspectives on Politics. vol. 3 (3) , pp.565-567
  • T. S. Aidt; Jayasri Dutta; Elena Loukoianova. (2006) 'Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938', in European Economic Review. vol. 50 (2) , pp.249-283
  • Samuel Berlinski; Torun Dewan; Keith Dowding. (2010) 'The impact of individual and collective performance on ministerial tenure', in Journal of Politics. vol. 72 (2) , pp.559-571
  • Leslie Johns; Rachel L. Wellhausen. (2016) 'Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment', in American Political Science Review. vol. 110 (1) , pp.31-51
  • Timothy Besley. (2007) 'The New Political Economy', in The Economic Journal. vol. 117 (524) , pp.F570-F587
  • Boix, Carles; Stokes, Susan C. (2003) 'Endogenous Democratization', in World Politics. vol. 55 (4) , pp.517-549
  • Haber, Stephen; Menaldo, Victor. (2011) 'Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse', in The American Political Science Review. vol. 105 (1) , pp.1-26
  • Allan H. Meltzer; Scott F. Richard. (1981) 'A Rational Theory of the Size of Government', in Journal of Political Economy. vol. 89 (5) , pp.914-927
  • Wright, Joseph. (2008) 'Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment', in American Journal of Political Science. vol. 52 (2) , pp.322-343
  • Dreher, A.; Sturm, J.-E.; Vreeland, J. R. (2015-02-01) 'Politics and IMF Conditionality', in Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 59 (1) , pp.120-148
  • Downs, Anthony. (c1957) An economic theory of democracy, New York: Harper.
  • Timothy Besley; Anne Case. (1995) 'Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits', in Quarterly Journal of Economics. vol. 110 (3) , pp.769-798
  • Downs, George W.; Rocke, David M.; Barsoom, Peter N. (1996) 'Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?', in International Organization. vol. 50 (3) , pp.379-406
  • (2005) The global economy: contemporary debates, New York: Pearson Longman.
  • Hollyer, James R. (2011-12-22) 'Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance', in Quarterly Journal of Political Science. vol. 6 (3-4) , pp.275-327
  • Ross, Michael L. (1999) 'Review: The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', in World Politics. vol. 51 (2) , pp.297-322
  • Eric C. Chang; Mark Andreas Kayser; Ronald Rogowski. (2008) 'Electoral Systems and Real Prices: Panel Evidence for the OECD Countries, 1970 2000', in British Journal of Political Science. vol. 38 (4) , pp.739-751
  • Treisman, Daniel. (2007-06) 'What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?', in Annual Review of Political Science. vol. 10 (1) , pp.211-244
  • Elena Nikolova. (2017) 'Destined for Democracy? Labour Markets and Political Change in Colonial British America', in British Journal of Political Science. vol. 47 (1) , pp.19-45
  • Timothy Besley; Jose G. Montalvo; Marta Reynal-Querol. (2011) 'Do educated leaders matter?', in The Economic Journal. vol. 121 (554) , pp.F205-F227
  • Michael T. Dorsch; Paul Maarek. (2019) 'Democratization and the Conditional Dynamics of Income Distribution', in American Political Science Review. vol. 113 (2) , pp.385-404
  • Quan Li. (2009) 'Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment', in Comparative Political Studies. vol. 42 (8) , pp.1098-1127
  • Nordhaus, William D. (1975-04) 'The Political Business Cycle', in The Review of Economic Studies. vol. 42 (2) , pp.169-
  • Fiorina, Morris P.; Abrams, Samuel J.; Pope, Jeremy. (c2011) Culture war?: the myth of a polarized America, Boston, MA: Longman. vol. Great questions in politics
  • Shepsle, Kenneth A. (c2010) Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions, New York: W.W. Norton.
  • Shi, Min; Svensson, Jakob. (2006-9) 'Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?', in Journal of Public Economics. vol. 90 (8-9) , pp.1367-1389
  • Gettleman, Jeffrey. (2011-07-07) 'South Sudan Prepares for Independence', in The New York Times.
  • Lasse Aaskoven; David Dreyer Lassen. (2017) 'Political Budget Cycles', in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics: Oxford University Press.
  • Nathan Jensen; Jong Hee Park. (2008) 'Where's the Beef? The Political Economy of U.S. Agriculture Policy', in The Political Economist. vol. 10 (2) , pp.1-8
  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair. (2009) 'A Political Economy of Aid', in International Organization. vol. 63 (2) , pp.309-340
  • MacFarquhar, Neil. (2011-06-09) 'In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace, for Now', in The New York Times., pp.111-134

The above list is indicative of the essential reading for the course. The library makes provision for all reading list items, with digital provision where possible, and these resources are shared between students. Further reading can be obtained from this module's reading list.

Assessment items, weightings and deadlines

Coursework / exam Description Deadline Coursework weighting
Coursework   Assignment 1    25% 
Coursework   Assignment 2    25% 
Coursework   Assignment 3    25% 
Coursework   Assignment 4    25% 

Exam format definitions

  • Remote, open book: Your exam will take place remotely via an online learning platform. You may refer to any physical or electronic materials during the exam.
  • In-person, open book: Your exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer to any physical materials such as paper study notes or a textbook during the exam. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
  • In-person, open book (restricted): The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer only to specific physical materials such as a named textbook during the exam. Permitted materials will be specified by your department. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
  • In-person, closed book: The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may not refer to any physical materials or electronic devices during the exam. There may be times when a paper dictionary, for example, may be permitted in an otherwise closed book exam. Any exceptions will be specified by your department.

Your department will provide further guidance before your exams.

Overall assessment

Coursework Exam
100% 0%

Reassessment

Coursework Exam
100% 0%
Module supervisor and teaching staff
Dr Lasse Aaskoven, email: lasse.aaskoven@essex.ac.uk.
Lasse Aaskoven
Dr Lasse Aasloven lasse.aaskoven@essex.ac.uk Module Module Administrator: Sallyann West, govquery@essex.ac.uk

 

Availability
No
Yes
No

External examiner

Dr Mohammed Rodwan Abouharb
University College London
Resources
Available via Moodle
Of 40 hours, 38 (95%) hours available to students:
2 hours not recorded due to service coverage or fault;
0 hours not recorded due to opt-out by lecturer(s).

 

Further information
Government

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