GV307-6-AP-CO:
Political Economy
2022/23
Government
Colchester Campus
Autumn & Spring
Undergraduate: Level 6
Current
Thursday 06 October 2022
Friday 30 June 2023
30
02 August 2022
Requisites for this module
(none)
(none)
(none)
(none)
(none)
BSC LL14 Economics and Politics (Including Foundation Year),
BSC LL2F Economics and Politics,
BSC LL3F Economics and Politics (Including Year Abroad),
BSC LL4F Economics and Politics (Including Placement Year)
This module requires knowledge of essay writing in political science. It also requires knowledge of applied statistics (especially regression analysis), algebra, analytic geometry, and differential calculus, all at GCSE level.
This module is about modern political economy, meaning analytical approaches to study how economic and political incentives interact to create constraints and opportunities that shape larger political and economic behaviour and outcomes. The module introduces students to the use of rigorous logic and evidence in order to understand classical political economy issues as well as to address contemporary policy issues in both domestic and international dimensions.
To introduce the students to key issues and research examples within political economy.
1. Know and discuss key issues in political economy.
2. Understand and solve formal political economy models.
3. Understand quantitative empirical evidence from research in political economy.
4. Analyze and discuss policy issues using methods and approaches from political economy.
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Timothy Besley (2007) ‘The New Political Economy’,
The Economic Journal, 117(524), pp. F570–F587. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4625573.
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Rubinstein, A. (2012)
Economic Fables. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjswm.
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Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2018) ‘Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries’,
European Journal of Political Economy, 55, pp. 29–35. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.10.003.
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Downs, A. (1957) ‘The Statics and Dynamics of Party Ideologies’, in An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper, pp. 114–141.
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Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Olson, M. (1993) ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’,
American Political Science Review, 87(3), pp. 567–576. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736.
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Sánchez de la Sierra, R. (2020) ‘On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo’,
Journal of Political Economy, 128(1), pp. 32–74. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1086/703989.
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Myerson, R.B. (2008) ‘The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State’,
American Political Science Review, 102(1), pp. 125–139. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080076.
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Blaydes, L. and Chaney, E. (2013) ‘The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE’,
American Political Science Review, 107(1), pp. 16–34. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000561.
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Queralt, D. (2019) ‘War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run’,
International Organization, 73(4), pp. 713–753. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818319000250.
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Garfias, F. and Sellars, E.A. (2021) ‘When State Building Backfires: Elite Coordination and Popular Grievance in Rebellion’,
American Journal of Political Science [Preprint]. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12611.
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Beramendi, P., Dincecco, M. and Rogers, M. (2019) ‘Intra-Elite Competition and Long-Run Fiscal Development’,
The Journal of Politics, 81(1), pp. 49–65. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1086/700273.
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Paglayan, A.S. (2022) ‘Education or Indoctrination? The Violent Origins of Public School Systems in an Era of State-Building’,
American Political Science Review, pp. 1–16. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000247.
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Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2001) ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’,
American Economic Review, 91(5), pp. 1369–1401. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369.
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Bruhn, M. and Gallego, F.A. (2012) ‘Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development?’,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), pp. 433–461. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00218.
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Banerjee, A. and Iyer, L. (2005) ‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’,
American Economic Review, 95(4), pp. 1190–1213. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825574.
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Guardado, J. (2018) ‘Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru’,
American Political Science Review, 112(4), pp. 971–995. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800045X.
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Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2005) ‘Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II’,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), pp. 835–864. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.835.
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Dell, M., Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. (2012) ‘Temperature Shocks and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Half Century’,
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(3), pp. 66–95. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.4.3.66.
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Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard (1981) ‘A Rational Theory of the Size of Government’,
Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), pp. 914–927. Available at:
https://www-journals-uchicago-edu.uniessexlib.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1086/261013.
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Ross, M. (2006) ‘Is Democracy Good for the Poor?’,
American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), pp. 860–874. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00220.x.
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Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2014) ‘Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution’,
British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), pp. 575–603. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000124.
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Kasara, K. and Suryanarayan, P. (2015) ‘When Do the Rich Vote Less Than the Poor and Why? Explaining Turnout Inequality across the World’,
American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), pp. 613–627. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12134.
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Boix, C. and Stokes, S.C. (2003) ‘Endogenous Democratization’,
World Politics, 55(4), pp. 517–549. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0019.
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Ross, M.L. (2001) ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’,
World Politics, 53(3), pp. 325–361. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011.
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Nalepa, M. (2010) ‘Captured Commitments: An Analytic Narrative of Transitions with Transitional Justice’,
World Politics, 62(2), pp. 341–380. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887110000079.
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Dewan, T. and Shepsle, K.A. (2011) ‘Political Economy Models of Elections’,
Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), pp. 311–330. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.042507.094704.
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Motolinia, L. (2021) ‘Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico’,
American Political Science Review, 115(1), pp. 97–113. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000672.
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Malik, R. (2020) ‘Transparency, Elections, and Pakistani Politicians’ Tax Compliance’,
Comparative Political Studies, 53(7), pp. 1060–1091. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019879964.
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Miller, G.J. (2005) ‘The Political Evolution Principal-Agent Models’,
Annual Review of Political Science, 8(1), pp. 203–225. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840.
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Gagliarducci, S. and Nannicini, T. (2013) ‘Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection’,
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(2), pp. 369–398. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12002.
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Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E. and Rose, S. (2011) ‘Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits’,
The Journal of Politics, 73(1), pp. 171–186. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000940.
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Eggers, A.C. (2014) ‘Partisanship and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from the UK Expenses Scandal’,
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 9(4), pp. 441–472. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00013140.
The above list is indicative of the essential reading for the course.
The library makes provision for all reading list items, with digital provision where possible, and these resources are shared between students.
Further reading can be obtained from this module's
reading list.
Assessment items, weightings and deadlines
Coursework / exam |
Description |
Deadline |
Coursework weighting |
Coursework |
Assignment 1 |
16/11/2022 |
25% |
Coursework |
Assignment 2 |
14/12/2022 |
25% |
Coursework |
Assignment 3 |
08/02/2023 |
25% |
Coursework |
Assignment 4 |
29/03/2023 |
25% |
Exam format definitions
- Remote, open book: Your exam will take place remotely via an online learning platform. You may refer to any physical or electronic materials during the exam.
- In-person, open book: Your exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer to any physical materials such as paper study notes or a textbook during the exam. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, open book (restricted): The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may refer only to specific physical materials such as a named textbook during the exam. Permitted materials will be specified by your department. Electronic devices may not be used in the exam.
- In-person, closed book: The exam will take place on campus under invigilation. You may not refer to any physical materials or electronic devices during the exam. There may be times when a paper dictionary,
for example, may be permitted in an otherwise closed book exam. Any exceptions will be specified by your department.
Your department will provide further guidance before your exams.
Overall assessment
Reassessment
Module supervisor and teaching staff
Dr Sergio Ascencio, email: sergio.ascencio@essex.ac.uk.
Sergio Ascencio
Module Supervisor: Sergio Ascencio sergio.ascencio@essex.ac.uk Administrator: govquery@essex.ac.uk
No
No
No
Dr Stefano Pagliari
City, University of London
Senior Lecturer in International Politics
Available via Moodle
Of 24 hours, 24 (100%) hours available to students:
0 hours not recorded due to service coverage or fault;
0 hours not recorded due to opt-out by lecturer(s), module, or event type.
Government
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