Algeria: Current Issues

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Summary

The United States has increasingly viewed the government of Algeria as an important partner in counterterrorism and the fight against Al Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa. The Algerian economy is largely based on hydrocarbons, and the country is a significant source of natural gas for the United States and Europe. Algeria receives little development assistance from the United States, but its security forces benefit from U.S. security assistance and participation in bilateral and regional military cooperation programs.

Algeria’s relative stability, always tenuous, has most recently been challenged by a series of riots, strikes, and popular demonstrations that have occurred since early January 2011. The unrest initially appeared to be motivated by discontent over food prices, but has turned more overtly political since mid-January. The example of neighboring Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” and the ripple effects of ongoing unrest in Egypt may contribute to opposition activism, with further protests anticipated in mid-February. The government has reacted both by attempting to assuage the public through political and economic concessions and by using the security forces to prevent and break up demonstrations. Across the region, other authoritarian governments have adopted a similar approach with varying results.

Algeria’s political system is dominated by a strong presidency. The military is the heir to Algeria’s long struggle for independence from France, and has remained the most significant political force since independence in 1962. Following Algeria’s bloody civil war in the 1990s, the military backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the presidency in 1999. He was reelected for a third term in April 2009 and has no clear successor. The voice of the military has been muted publicly since Bouteflika was first selected, but may be heard during a future presidential succession. Low voter turnout in the May 2007 parliamentary election may have reflected general lack of public faith in the political system in general and the weak legislature in particular. Authorities specifically boasted of a higher turnout in the 2009 presidential election, though some observers have questioned official turnout statistics.

Domestic terrorism perpetrated by violent Islamists remains Algeria’s principal security challenge. Algerian terrorists also operate across the southern border in the Sahel and are linked to terrorism abroad. The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The more notorious and active is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and may increasingly be described as a criminal-terrorist mutation. Algeria, as the dominant economic and military power in the region, has attempted to take the lead in developing a regional approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel. The legacy of Algeria’s anti-colonial independence struggle contributes to Algerian leaders’ desire to prevent direct foreign counterterrorism intervention and their residual skepticism of French intentions. See also CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.

President Bouteflika’s tenure has produced an energized foreign policy. Strains in ties with neighboring Morocco continue, due mainly to the unresolved status of the Western Sahara, but also to a rivalry for regional power. Relations with former colonial power France remain complex and volatile. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, by Alexis Arieff.
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Recent Developments: Political Unrest

Algerian citizens have carried out a series of riots, strikes, and protests, initially stemming from discontent over high food prices, since early January 2011. The protests have turned more overtly political since late January, with demonstrators calling for political reforms and using slogans that directly reference the recent public uprising in neighboring Tunisia—dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution”—that unseated Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. At least four Algerians have died from self-immolation, a phenomenon that has echoed across the region after a frustrated Tunisian street vendor helped spark the demonstrations there by setting himself on fire.

Urban riots and other civil disturbances, often led by unemployed youth, are common in Algeria and are sometimes tolerated by the authorities. However, the Algerian government is taking a defensive stance toward the recent unrest, despite official denials of potential “contagion” from Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the region. Initially, the government attempted to address economic grievances by lowering the prices of key food commodities. This is a frequent tactic in Algeria, where oil and gas revenues may be used to buy off dissenters. On January 22, security forces initiated a crackdown, forcibly breaking up a “pro-democracy” protest in Algiers, and the Interior Ministry has since banned public demonstrations. A protest on January 29 in the eastern city of Béjaïa, in the region of Kabylie, was nonetheless tolerated; security forces largely withdrew from the area following an uprising in 2001 (see “Human Rights,” below). The government has since taken further steps to assuage political opponents, notably by promising to repeal Algeria’s “state of emergency,” which has been in place since the start of the civil war in 1992 and enables a range of restrictions on civil liberties. Draft legislation that would lift the state of emergency was adopted by Algeria’s parliament on February 22, according to press reports.

On February 12 and February 19, public demonstrations were organized in Algiers and other urban centers by a newly formed umbrella group of small opposition parties, civil society groups, and non-official trade unions, dubbed the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD). In the capital, several thousand demonstrators turned out on both dates, according to witnesses, despite government attempts to preclude mass gatherings through the preventive deployment of tens of thousands of police and other security officers. (Government officials put the number of demonstrators in the hundreds.) Protesters were reportedly arrested and beaten by police at both February rallies, and some clashed with pro-government demonstrators who deployed at the same time. Still, security forces have so far shown greater restraint than in some countries in the region, and have not opened fire on crowds. The CNCD has called for further protests in the coming weeks. There have also been labor strikes, protests by the unemployed, and student demonstrations across the country; for example, reports in the local press indicate that security forces violently repressed a university student protest in front of the Ministry for Higher Education in Algiers on February 21.

The CNCD coalition, whose operational strength, mass appeal, and cohesion are uncertain, has articulated several demands, including “greater democracy,” the lifting of the 1992 state of emergency, and the end of the state of emergency.

1 See CRS Report RS21666, Political Transition in Tunisia, by Alexis Arieff.
emergency, the freeing of individuals detained during previous protests and riots, a loosening of state controls over the media, greater opportunities for employment, and “social justice.” The creation of the CNCD echoes other recent attempts by civil society activists to channel anti-government grievances, including the March 19 movement (2009) and the National Front for Change (November 2010). The political party that is most prominently involved in the CNCD is the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), a small, secularist, Berber-dominated party led by longtime activist Said Sadi. Another key actor is the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH). Islamist political parties and activists do not appear to have played a significant role in the recent unrest.

Political parties that support President Abdelaziz Bouteflika have portrayed recent protests as the product of “foreign interference.” At the same time, and although major political parties have not joined the CNCD, the protests have been accompanied by unusually critical, pro-reform statements from individuals associated with Algeria’s independence struggle and therefore viewed as benefitting from high levels of public esteem.

The potential for a popular uprising to prompt genuine changes in Algeria’s status quo is difficult to evaluate. Several factors may weigh in favor of political continuity. Key among them is the role played by Algeria’s military, which is seen as the ultimate arbiter of domestic politics and backed the political rise of President Bouteflika. Algeria’s political system is also relatively more open, and the domestic press is subject to relatively fewer controls, than in several countries in the region, such as Libya or Tunisia under Ben Ali. At the same time, there are many potential vectors for instability. This is in part due to Algeria’s turbulent history of civil conflict and to the security threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which seeks to overturn the current Algerian regime and has carried out a number of attacks within the country. Popular anger over perceived official corruption, unemployment, and urban housing shortages is also widespread. Ethnic and regional identities remain strong, and some groups have opposed the government, especially ethnic Berber communities (also known as Imazighen), concentrated in the mountainous Kabylie region, in the northeast. Reports of divisions within the politico-military elite, while difficult to substantiate, have repeatedly surfaced over the past year. Still, although the “dark decade” of the 1990s was characterized by high levels of violence, some observers contend that vivid memories of that time period have rendered many Algerians adverse to perceived insecurity and therefore prone to reject widespread anti-government mobilization.

Issues for U.S. Policy

The United States has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism with encouragement of greater democratization (see “U.S. Relations” below). Algeria is viewed as an important partner in countering Al Qaeda-linked groups, and plays an increasingly significant role in the African Union (AU), which the United States seeks to empower in regional security and conflict resolution. At the same time, the State Department continues to document a

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wide range of human rights problems, including restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression, and association, which impair political party activity and limit citizens’ ability to change the government through elections. Other abuses reportedly include official impunity and limited judicial independence (see “Human Rights,” below).

U.S. policy challenges in Algeria in some ways resemble those faced elsewhere in the region. However, because of the limited nature of U.S. assistance (see Table 1) and Algeria’s famous resistance to outside pressure, the U.S. government may find that it lacks well-developed levers of influence needed to successfully encourage political reform.

Figure 1. Map of Algeria and Its Neighbors

Source: CRS.
Background

Algerians fought a protracted independence war against the French between 1954 and 1962. The guerilla conflict was notable for its brutal tactics: the pro-independence National Liberation Front (FLN) carried out urban terrorist attacks while the French military engaged in torture and other abuses. After an independence referendum on July 1, 1962, the FLN became the national ruling party, and remained politically dominant for decades. The anti-colonial struggle remains a key foundation of Algeria’s political identity. Algeria was a leader in the Non-Aligned movement during the Cold War, and although Algeria engaged in military cooperation with the Soviet Union during that period, it never allowed foreign bases on its soil and strongly defended its independent status.

In 1965, Houari Boumediène seized power through a military coup and served as revolutionary council chairman and president until his death in 1978. Another military figure, Chadli Bendjedid, succeeded Boumediène. The 1980s saw the rise of Islamist ideology, starting on university campuses and eventually escalating into the most significant political challenge to the FLN since independence. In October 1988, mass protests and riots erupted, revealing widespread discontent with the FLN’s leadership and altering the political landscape. The government attempted to outflank Islamists, passing restrictions on women’s socioeconomic rights, but it also initiated a process of political and economic liberalization. In 1989, a new constitution (the country’s third) was adopted by referendum that enabled greater political pluralism and paved the way for multiparty competition, while also introducing explicit language about the Islamic nature of the Algerian state and society.

The same year, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was formed as a broad coalition of Islamist groups. The government recognized the FIS as a legal political party and allowed it to compete in local elections in 1990, in which it won over 50% of votes cast. In the first round of parliamentary elections held in December 1991, the FIS again did well, and was expected to win a majority of seats in a second round scheduled for early 1992. Before that round could be held, however, the army intervened in January 1992, forcing Bendjedid to resign and canceling the election results. The FIS was banned and many of its leaders imprisoned.

As channels for political competition were shuttered, the thwarted Islamist movement fractured, with some factions turning to violence. A decade of civil war between security forces and Islamist insurgents ensued, which resulted in an as many as 200,000 deaths. The conflict was characterized by high levels of civilian atrocities, including massacres, murders, and extrajudicial executions. While insurgents were responsible for or inspired much of the violence, questions

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remain about the government’s culpability in violence during the conflict. The government also restricted freedom of the press, assembly, and movement. Relative stability was restored by the early 2000s, aided by the introduction of an amnesty for former militants.

Government and Politics

The president has long dominated the domestic political system in Algeria, generally with strong backing from the military. In 1999, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a civilian with vital military support, won the presidential election after all other candidates withdrew, charging fraud. In April 2004, he was reelected with 83.5% of the vote in a multiparty contest during which the military was officially neutral. International observers hailed that election as progress toward democratization even though the bureaucracy and judiciary had manipulated the political process to favor Bouteflika in the pre-election period. Many saw Bouteflika’s victory as an accurate reflection of the popular will and an endorsement of his effort to decrease violence and for continued political stability. Since 2005, there have been persistent rumors about the state of the 73-year-old president’s health, spurred in part by his repeated, intermittent absences from public view, but no strong concern that he lacks a clear successor. Most analysts expect the military will again play a determining role in the choice of Bouteflika’s replacement.

In November 2008, a joint session of parliament adopted constitutional amendments that, among other provisions, abolished presidential term limits and allowed Bouteflika to run for a third term. A huge salary increase for legislators may have contributed to the amendments’ passage. Some critics had argued that the constitutional changes required a national referendum, but the Constitutional Court disagreed. On April 9, 2009, as expected, Bouteflika won another term as president with more than 90.24% of the vote over five challengers, none of whom was seen as having a remote chance of ending his leadership. The Interior Ministry claimed a 74% voter turnout. Once again, the president’s rivals alleged fraud and added claims that the authorities had inflated turnout figures. Some attributed the military’s acquiescence this time to their inability to find an alternative to Bouteflika.

Algerians refer to Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be) to designate opaque politico-military elite structures that are widely perceived as driving events and major political decisions—as opposed to “le gouvernement” (the government), elected representatives and administrators who are viewed as having little significant power. A series of anti-corruption inquiries since 2009, including an investigation of the state energy company, SONATRACH, and another into a $12 billion, 927-kilometer east-west highway project, have been viewed by some analysts as revealing latent divisions within the security establishment, and could signal potential fracture points if national protests place increasing pressure on the government. (See “The Economy,” below.)

The president heads the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the High Security Council, and appoints the prime minister. On June 23, 2008, Bouteflika named National Democratic Rally (RND) leader Ahmed Ouyahia, who had served as prime minister from 1995 to 1999 and from 2003 to 2006, and who is known to be close to the military, to the post again. After his re-election

in 2009, Bouteflika reconfirmed Ouyahia as prime minister. Ouyahia is considered a possible successor to Bouteflika. Media reports suggest that Bouteflika’s younger brother, Said, also may have presidential ambitions. Speculation about Bouteflika’s successor intermittently surfaces along with the rumors about the president’s health.

The bicameral, multiparty parliament is weak. The president appoints the prime minister as well as one-third of the upper house of parliament, known as the Council of the Nation. (The remaining two-thirds are selected by indirect vote.) Although either the president or one of the parliamentary chambers may initiate legislation, it cannot be passed into law without being brought before both chambers, which requires the support of the presidency. The 380-seat National People’s Assembly was last elected on May 17, 2007, with a voter turnout of 36.5%—the lowest ever, reflecting lack of popular faith in the political system and common knowledge that the legislature has little power. Parties in the governing coalition placed at the top: the National Liberation Front (FLN) won 23% of the vote and 136 seats; the RND 10.3%, 61 seats; and the moderately Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) 9.6%, 51 seats; 18 other parties and 33 independents also won seats. The Council of the Nation has 144 seats, of which the FLN has 29, RND 12, and MSP 3; independents and presidential appointees comprise the remainder. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for 2012.

Terrorism

Up to 200,000 lives were lost during Algeria’s civil war between 1992 and 2000, most attributable to terrorist acts by Islamist groups. The security situation has markedly improved since then, but domestic terrorism has not been eliminated. The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and last attacked in 2006. Former GIA members have accepted the government amnesty or joined other groups. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998, declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003 and, after Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood) became “emir” or leader, united with it officially on September 11, 2006, taking the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM or Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, AQLIM).

AQIM seeks to replace the current Algerian regime with an Islamic state and calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain. The practical meaning of the union with Al Qaeda is uncertain, and analysts suggest that links between AQIM and Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan/Afghanistan are nominal, but mutually beneficial. Adopting the famous name may have enhanced AQIM’s legitimacy among extremists and facilitated recruitment, while enabling Al Qaeda to burnish its international credentials. Since “uniting” with Al Qaeda, AQIM’s rhetoric against the West and governments in the region and its calls for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain have increased. AQIM’s cohesiveness is questioned as it may be operating as relatively autonomous and/or rival groups and has experienced defections. The U.S. State

Department estimates AQIM’s strength at under 1,000 in Algeria, with a smaller number in the Sahel to the south; other sources provide lower estimates.\(^{16}\)

After Droukdel became leader, AQIM increased its attacks against the Algerian government and security forces, and against foreign workers in the country.\(^{17}\) In 2007, it shifted tactics to more frequent, “Iraqi style,” suicide attacks, with simultaneous bombings of the Government Palace (the prime and interior ministries) and a suburban police station on April 11, 2007, and of the Constitutional Council and the U.N. headquarters on December 11, among other attacks. In addition, an AQIM suicide bomber unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Bouteflika on September 6, 2007. All of these attacks resulted in many civilian casualties. After a relative lull, AQIM again targeted security forces in the summer of 2008. That August, suicide bombers perpetrated a particularly bloody assault on a police academy, resulting in more than 40 deaths.

Since 2009, AQIM has operated more outside of Algiers and other large cities where security forces have made it difficult to operate, and it has continued to focus on the Berber region of the Kabylie, in northeastern Algeria, where the security presence was reduced after civil unrest in 2005. In line with Droukdel’s regional ambitions and because of difficulties experienced in the north, the group’s operations also have moved into the Sahelian countries of Mauritania, Niger, and Mali, with aspirations to spread as far south as Nigeria.\(^{18}\) Activities along the Malian border have manifestly increased and AQIM reportedly has agreements with tribes in northern Mali, sometimes sealed by marriage and/or financial compensation. In May 2009, AQIM claimed responsibility for executing a British hostage in Mali and, in June, it shot a U.S. aid worker while attempting to kidnap him in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Also in June, terrorists killed 24 gendarmes (paramilitary police) in an ambush about 218 miles east of Algiers. In July, they ambushed a military convoy in Tipaza Province, 90 miles west of Algiers; at least 14 soldiers were killed.\(^{19}\) In August, AQIM attacked the French Embassy in the capital. In October, terrorists killed seven and wounded three security guards at a Canadian water project. In November, an AQIM cell kidnapped three Spanish relief workers in Mauritania and unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap U.S. embassy employees in Niger. In June 2010, a suicide bomber attacked a police barracks 60 miles east of Algiers, killing at least nine. In July 2010, AQIM claimed responsibility for attacking a police convoy near the border with Mali, killing 11 gendarmes and seizing weapons.

The AQIM organizational structure is hazy. Droukdel may be the spiritual leader or ideologue of the group who sets broad directions, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Yahia Djouadi have gained public prominence as (perhaps rival) leaders of AQIM regional commands or “emirates” in the Sahel who oversee operations. Alternatively, they may be independent of Droukdel. Abdelhamid Abu Zaid (aka Abid Hammadou) is associated with Djouadi and reportedly is heavily engaged in

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\(^{16}\) State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, op. cit.

\(^{17}\) An Algerian court sentenced Droukdel in absentia to life imprisonment for his membership in a terrorist organization and involvement in kidnappings.


\(^{19}\) Some attributed the second ambush to the Protectors of Salafi Call, which reportedly had split from the GSPC and, therefore, is not considered part of AQIM. Others attributed the attack to a different regional command of AQIM or suggested that AQIM is encroaching on the Protectors’ territory. “Algerian Army Launches ‘Large Scale’ Operations an Al-Qaidah Maghreb,” *El-Khabar* website, August 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Five Regions Reportedly Designated for ‘Terrorist Deployment’ in Algeria, *El-Khabar* website, August 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, “Retreating of the Salafi Call Protectors,” *Echourouk el Youmi* website, August 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Newsfile.
money-making criminal activities. AQIM raises funds by kidnapping\(^{20}\) for ransoms and by trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles, cigarettes, and persons across that vast region. The Algerian military claims that AQIM provides protection in return for cash for convoys smuggling drugs from South America, across the Sahara, to Europe.\(^{21}\) All of these activities have led some to describe it as a “hybrid terrorist-criminal organization” or a “criminal organization with an attachment to Al Qaeda.”\(^{22}\) AQIM reportedly gets some small-scale funding from cells in Europe.\(^{23}\) AQIM communicates with potential recruits via sophisticated internet videos.

Algeria is a major source of transnational terrorists and was the fourth-largest supplier of anti-coalition fighters to Iraq.\(^{24}\) Some Algerians were captured in Afghanistan and, at one time, a total of 26 were held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; most have been repatriated. The Bush and Obama Administrations sought assurances from Algiers that repatriated detainees would not pose a future danger and would be treated fairly. Several were tried after their return home and acquitted for lack of evidence.

Algerians have been arrested on suspicion of belonging to or supporting AQIM in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Britain. In 2010, there have been unconfirmed reports of Algerians fighting with Islamist terrorist groups in Yemen and Somalia. In addition, several major international terrorist plots have involved Algerians. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian trained in Afghanistan was arrested after attempting to enter the United States from Canada; he was convicted for the so-called Millennium Plot to carry out bomb attacks in Los Angeles. His associates and other Algerians in Canada were linked to the GIA and Al Qaeda. In January 2003, six Algerians were arrested in a London apartment with traces of ricin, a deadly poison with no known antidote. In October 2009, two French brothers of Algerian origin, one a worker at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, were arrested in France after intelligence agencies came to suspect them of “criminal activities related to a terror group,” that is, AQIM.\(^{25}\)

### Counterterrorism

After President Bouteflika took office, he sought to add peaceful means to the government’s tactics to counter terrorism. In September 1999, a national referendum approved the “Civil Concord,” an amnesty for those who had fought the government. In September 2005, another referendum approved the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, including an amnesty for all except murderers, rapists, and bombers, exemption for security forces from prosecution for crimes of the 1990s, and compensation for families of victims of violence and the disappeared. Critics charge that it has resulted in the freeing of recidivist terrorists or that it failed to provide

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\(^{22}\) CSIS 2010, op. cit.


accountability for the disappeared and for truth-telling about the role of the security forces. A presidential commission determined that excesses of unsupervised security forces were responsible for the disappearances of 6,146 civilians from 1992 to 2000 and recommended compensation. Organizations representing victims’ families claim up to 20,000 disappeared. The government has extended the amnesty period indefinitely and has controversially extended it to some former GSPC leaders.

In 2008, the government began to recruit 100,000 new police and gendarme officers to reinforce borders, augment security at airports, and increase the security presence in major cities. As noted above, it has been mostly successful in impeding terrorist operations in cities. In addition, the government deployed thousands of troops to Saharan provinces along Algeria’s borders with Mali, Niger, and Mauritania to combat AQIM.

Algeria is the region’s dominant economic and military power and it has promoted a regional approach in which it is the lead actor to counter terrorism. It recognizes the immensity of the Sahara Desert-Sahel territory and believes that intra-regional cooperation is needed to fight AQIM. In line with its anti-colonial creed, Algiers is wary of a potential foreign direct counterterrorism role and seeks to prevent foreign, non-African (i.e., French and U.S.) involvement/interference/intervention in the region. It fears that AQIM’s propensity to kidnap Westerners for ransom might provoke direct foreign intervention and that Algeria’s weaker neighbors might be vulnerable to great power influence, especially if exercised by France— their former colonial ruler. In addition, Algiers seeks to impede AQIM’s ability to extract large ransoms from Western governments and, thereby, to build up a treasury to pay more recruits and buy more arms. While it opposes a foreign presence, Algiers welcomes other outside support for counterterrorist operations.

In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. In August, the military chiefs of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset and agreed to cooperate more to counter terrorism and related crime and developed the so-called “Tamanrasset Plan.” In April 2010, following this framework, they began to set up a joint command center for security and military coordination in Tamanrasset; Libya is not participating, while Burkina Faso is observing. Probably due to strained bilateral ties (see “Foreign Affairs” below) and because Algiers argues that the security of the Sahel does not concern Morocco, it has not invited its western neighbor to participate in regional counterterrorism efforts—despite AQIM’s attempt to use Moroccan territory as a route to smuggle drugs to Europe. Participating governments established several coordinating committees, assigned countries specific missions, and reportedly agreed to increase the number of security forces, gendarmerie, and soldiers deployed for counterterrorism in the Sahel from 25,000 (15,000 of whom were Algerian) to 75,000. Algeria already had increased its forces in the region to 25,000.26 Algeria is providing arms, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, and training to Mali, Niger, and Mauritania and attempting to mount joint operations with their forces. Several additional high-level counterterrorism meetings have been held.

The sometimes dissonant relations among the neighbors and their dependence on France have limited implementation of Algeria’s regional approach and the Tamanrasset plan in practice. This was apparent in July 2010, when French and Mauritanian forces carried out an unsuccessful raid

26 “Anti-Terrorism Troops in the Sahel Increased from 25,000 to 75,000,” El-Khabar website, April 24, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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into Mali, without Mali’s permission, to rescue a Frenchman reportedly held by Abu Zaid’s group. The effort failed and AQIM later announced that it had executed the hostage. In August, Mali, reportedly acting for Spain, negotiated with AQIM and secured the release of two Spanish hostages in exchange for two AQIM members and perhaps a ransom as well.\(^{27}\) Mali thereby angered its neighbors, including Algeria, who oppose the payment of ransoms. Algeria does not seem able to compete with European power, influence, and assistance to Sahelian governments.

On occasion, Algiers has condemned its neighbors for releasing terrorists as ransom for hostages kidnapped by AQIM. Algeria recalled its ambassador from Mali in February 2010 after its government, under considerable pressure from Paris, released four terrorists in exchange for a French hostage—an alleged aid worker who was later found to be an intelligence officer. Shortly thereafter, President Bouteflika postponed a visit to France and Algiers refused to schedule a visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria.

Human Rights

A state of emergency declared in 1992 at the outset of the conflict between the Algerian security forces and Islamist terrorists remains in effect, although Algerian officials have recently signaled that this may change. According to the U.S. State Department *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*, 2009, human rights problems in Algeria include restrictions on freedom of assembly and association which significantly impair political party activity and limit citizens’ ability to change the government through elections, and failure to account for persons who disappeared in detention in the 1990s. Other abuses reportedly include official impunity, abuse of pretrial detention, poor prison conditions, limited judicial independence, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Reports of torture and abuse occur, but are fewer than in previous years. There are limitations on religious freedom and problems with security-based restrictions on movement, corruption and lack of government transparency, discrimination and violence against women, and restrictions on workers rights.\(^{28}\) Algerian officials have criticized and disputed these U.S. reports.

The State Department’s *International Religious Freedoms Report, 2010* noted that “the status of respect for religious freedom by the government improved marginally during the reporting period.”\(^{29}\) However, it also stated that “the government’s National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Services did not establish an administrative means for non-Muslim religious groups to register with the government as required by law,” and that “government officials also publicly criticized evangelism and emphasized the dominant role of Islam in society.” Nonetheless, the report recognized that “there were some positive changes in the government’s treatment of religious minorities.” The government “ceased prosecutions of members of minority religious groups; paid increasing attention to Christian groups’ concerns, including organizing a symposium on religious worship; officially recognized the first official representative of the Jewish community in the country; and allowed for the reopening of 25 synagogues. However, the


government reportedly did not approve any other requests for registration by non-Muslim religious associations, including Christian requests.

The Department’s *Trafficking in Persons Report* places Algeria on the Tier 2 Watch List with regard to human trafficking because it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.” In January 2009, the government approved legislation that criminalizes trafficking in persons for the purposes of labor and sexual exploitation. It later “helped formulate a training program for police, judges, and prosecutors on its counter-trafficking law. Despite these efforts, the government did not show overall progress in punishing trafficking crimes and protecting trafficking victims and continued to lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.”

The Berbers, natives of North Africa from before the seventh century Arab Muslim invasions, are a group with specific human rights concerns. They seek language and cultural rights and an end to government discrimination and neglect. In April 2001 (“Black Spring”), the death of a Berber youth in custody sparked riots in which security forces killed 126 people. The government agreed to compensate the victims and recognize Tamazight, a Berber language, as a national language, but not an official language. Berber activists want national language status, but President Bouteflika and others have opposed this change. The government engaged in a dialogue with Berber representatives known as the *Arouch*. In January 2005, the government agreed to rehabilitate protesters and remove security forces from Berber areas, and established a joint committee to follow up. Berber areas are in the mountainous Kabylie region, which, with the withdrawal of security forces, has become a focus for AQIM activity.

**The Economy**

Hydrocarbons (oil and gas) are the engine of the Algerian economy, providing about 60% of the budget revenues, 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 97% of export earnings. In the past decade, high oil prices boosted foreign monetary reserves and economic growth, fueled a construction boom, eased unemployment somewhat, and produced early repayment of foreign debt. In 2009, however, the global recession resulted in a significant decline in hydrocarbon exports and a concomitant drop in revenues. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluation concluded that the government’s expansionary fiscal policies (including high levels of investment in public infrastructure) had nonetheless enabled Algeria to weather the crisis well. At the same time, the IMF noted that Algeria remains “highly dependent on fluctuations of hydrocarbon prices and on public expenditure,” and suggested that further structural reforms remain necessary to “strengthen and develop the financial sector, enhance the business climate and competitiveness, promote private investment and support economic diversification.”

In October 2008, Finance Minister Karim Djoudi asserted that the global financial crisis would not affect Algeria because it is not present in international banking, because it had sharply reduced its national debt, relies increasingly on domestic financing to fund development, and has rejected total convertibility of the *dinar* (the national currency). However, critics pointed out as

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weaknesses the absence of a modern financial market, an undeveloped stock exchange, an
underdeveloped banking system, and a failure to integrate in the world economy. Some
observers suggest that a continuing tide of illegal young Algerian immigrants to Europe is
evidence of the failure of the economy to serve the people before, during, and now after the
global crisis has begun to subside.

The state energy company, SONATRACH, accounts for 98% of Algeria’s foreign currency
receipts and employs 120,000. A 2005 hydrocarbon law diminished SONATRACH’s monopoly,
opening the sector for private and foreign investment. A 2006 law, however, required international
companies to give SONATRACH a 51% stake in new oil, gas, and related transport projects.
Further restrictive foreign investment rules were enacted in 2009. Such changes have prompted
foreign investors, including U.S. businesses and government, to appeal for greater stability of
laws in Algeria. (See “U.S. Investment and Energy Issues,” below.)

In January 2010, nearly the entirety of SONATRACH’s senior management were removed from
their posts as a result of an official investigation into alleged corruption in the awarding of
contracts. Charges were brought against several executives, including the CEO, Mohamed
Meziane, and a number of government officials. The government provided few public comments
on the investigation, and some analysts viewed it as opaque and potentially politically
motivated. The shakeup had little visible impact on production and did not significantly disrupt
the company’s operations. However, it appeared to contribute to the president’s decision to
replace then-Minister of Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil, formerly a powerful figure, in May
2010. In November, SONATRACH published new anti-corruption guidelines for staff, partner
companies, and contractors.

In 2008, Khelil held the rotating presidency of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). At the time, he blamed the weak dollar, speculators, and geopolitical tensions
for rising oil prices, not the market. Khelil sought the formation of a “gas OPEC” to protect
exporters, but found little support among other suppliers.

Algeria has several pipelines supplying gas to Europe and plans for more. In July 2009, Algeria,
Niger, and Nigeria agreed to build an ambitious $10 billion Trans-Saharan pipeline to ship natural
gas to Europe. The aim of the project is to facilitate the economic development of the transit
countries and provide Europe with another source of energy security. Other new projects include
the TransMed pipeline to transport Algerian gas via Tunisia to Italy and the Galsi pipeline to
transport gas directly from Algeria to Italy. Algeria also is expanding its exploration and drilling.

The government is directing some of its hydrocarbon revenues for development. A $140 billion,
five-year plan that ended in 2009 invested in infrastructure, highways, ports, airports, and water
resources. Another $286 billion, five-year plan for the period 2010-2014 now follows. The plans
are intended to generate non-carbon related growth and employment, which the government has
been hard-pressed to achieve thus far. In September 2010, the government announced that it is
requiring foreign investors seeking to participate in infrastructure projects to form a joint venture
with an Algerian company.

34 Reuters, “Interview—Algeria Corruption Case ’Part of Political Struggle,’” February 8, 2010.
35 Randah Taqiy-al-Din, “’OPEC’ Decides to Maintain its Current Production,” Al-Hayat, March 6, 2008, via BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
Despite the country’s considerable oil and gas income and investments, there are chronic socioeconomic problems: high unemployment and underemployment; inadequate housing, health services, and education; decaying infrastructure; great inequality of income distribution; and government corruption.36 These conditions have sparked social protests in several areas of the country. In August 2009, Chinese workers clashed with Algerians in Algiers. The incident was attributed in part to unemployed Algerians’ resentment of the estimated 50,000 Chinese working on development projects. There have been no subsequent reports of similar incidents. (China has been awarded approximately $20 billion in contracts under the new development plan and has surged to become second only to France as a supplier of imports to Algeria.37 It has yet to become a major recipient of Algerian oil exports, but it is actively prospecting new fields.)

Algeria has applied to join the World Trade Organization, but has many problems to overcome first. Among them is central control of the economy that is only easing slowly, with a very selective privatization program. The government argues that its conditions for foreign investment are needed to encourage domestic companies.

**Foreign Affairs**

After independence in 1962, Algeria was in the forefront of Third World politics, especially the Non-Aligned Movement, and very active in the Arab world and Africa. It was considerably less active in the 1990s, when it was preoccupied by domestic violence. Since Bouteflika became president, Algeria has reemerged as a regional actor, especially in Africa. It has provided airlift support for U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur and for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia. In February 2010, President Bouteflika also promised to contribute 1,700 soldiers to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).38

**Morocco**

Algeria and Morocco are the largest countries in North Africa and are neighbors, but they had different colonial experiences and emerged with distinctly different forms of government and a rivalry. Algeria achieved its independence via a bloody revolution and emerged as a republic with military or military-influenced governments. Morocco, on the other hand, is a centuries-old monarchy that made a more peaceful transition from French control. Shortly after Algeria became independent, Morocco laid claim to some Algerian territory, and they went to war for about five months in 1963-1964. The border was not demarcated until 1972.

Algeria’s current relations with Morocco are particularly strained because Algeria supports and hosts the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), which seeks independence for the former Spanish Sahara, known as the Western Sahara. Thousands of Saharouis (as the people of Western Sahara are known) occupy several refugee

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36 Algeria is placed 105 out of 178 countries assessed on Transparency International’s 2010 *Corruption Perceptions Index*, online at http://www.transparency.org.


38 At the time of writing, they had yet to be deployed.
camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria. The camps are under the purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but are run by the POLISARIO. Morocco also claims and largely occupies the Western Sahara. Algeria considers the problem of the Western Sahara to be one of decolonization requiring resolution by the U.N., and it maintains that it is not a party to the conflict. Algiers viewed with favor the direct, unconditional talks between the POLISARIO and Morocco that began in June 2007 in response to a U.N. Security Council call. However, no progress resulted from those talks. The U.N. Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Christopher Ross held renewed, albeit “informal,” direct talks in December 2010 and January 2011, but has not disclosed any progress; he was quoted in the press as stating that “Each party continues to reject the other as a sole basis for future negotiations.” The parties continue to reiterate uncompromising positions and do not inspire optimism for achieving a settlement.

Algeria had said that it would like to improve bilateral relations with Morocco by excluding the Western Sahara issue from that equation. Yet, Algiers refuses to reopen the border with Morocco, which it closed 15 years ago in retaliation for Moroccan accusations that Algerians were involved in terror attacks in Marrakesh. Algiers maintains that smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration need to be dealt with before it opens the border and that an opening would endanger Algeria’s national security. It also believes that Morocco has more to gain in trade and tourism than Algeria if the border were reopened. Algerians note that Morocco continues to levy accusations against Algeria on the Western Sahara issue at the same time that it seeks benefits from Algeria.

France

Algeria and France, its former colonizer, have complex, unpredictable relations. France is Algeria’s major trading partner. About 4 million Algerians and individuals of Algerian descent live in France, but France has decreased visas for Algerians out of fear of terrorism and absorption difficulties. Under Bouteflika, French-Algerian relations initially warmed considerably. However, a planned treaty of friendship fizzled when France rejected Algeria’s demand for an apology for the crimes of colonization. President Nicolas Sarkozy refuses to apologize, but acknowledges that colonialism was “profoundly unjust.” He seeks to deepen bilateral business and trade ties, advance civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and promote the European Union’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a community of states bordering the sea. France’s inclusion of Algerians on a list of persons subject to “meticulous inspection” for security purposes at French airports prompted Algiers to demand that Algerians be removed from the list and to cancel, or at least postpone, a January 2010 visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to Algeria. An Algerian official later described UfM as a “Trojan horse for the normalization with Israel” and said that Algeria is not interested in it “if its aim is to normalize relations with the Zionist regime.”

41 Minister of State and special representative of the President Abdelaziz Belkhadem, quoted in El-Khabar website, June 18, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
AQIM has kidnapped several French citizens in the Sahel, and the group declared war on
President Sarkozy after the failed French attempt to free a hostage in July 2010 resulted in several
AQIM casualties. Algeria criticized the July action, and Foreign Minister Kouchner did not visit
Algeria when he subsequently tried to get increased Sahelian cooperation with Paris to fight
terrorism. President Sarkozy has declared that France is at war with AQIM and has made fighting
the group one of his highest priorities, dispatching military and intelligence forces and equipment
to the Sahel. He also said that France would no longer pay ransoms.42 If the French government
follows through on this pledge and consults Algiers about countering terrorism, then bilateral
relations and counterterrorism efforts may benefit. However, France has economic and other
interests (i.e., uranium mines) in the Sahel and may, on occasion, seek to further them
unilaterally, without consulting its former colony. Nonetheless, by October, the perception of a
common AQIM threat appeared to be fostering an improvement in bilateral relations as Algerian
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci described them as “turning a new corner” and “strategic.”43

European Union

With France’s support, Algeria signed an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in
2001 and has participated in the Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) since 1995. In
March 2009, Algeria enacted a law making it a crime to leave “the national territory in an illegal
manner” in order to address EU concerns about illegal immigration as well as to stop human
trafficking. At the same time, Algeria wants Europe to assist with development in order to strike
at the causes of emigration.

U.S. Relations

U.S.-Algerian ties date from a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1775. Algerians have fond
memories of President Kennedy’s support for their independence from France.44 Relations
suffered later due to Cold War ideological differences, as Algeria was a socialist republic with
close ties to the Soviet Union. They have been re-energized over the past decade, and Bouteflika
met with President George W. Bush several times. Bouteflika attended the June 2004 Group of
Eight (G-8) summit in Sea Island, Georgia.

U.S. policy has tried to balance appreciation for Algeria’s cooperation in counterterrorism with
encouragement of democratization. U.S. officials have urged Algiers to lift the state of emergency
and described the April 2004 presidential election as an important phase in a democratic process.
Algeria receives limited U.S. aid.

The U.S.-Algeria relationship is highly focused on security cooperation and counterterrorism. In
2005, the United States and Algeria launched a Joint Military Dialogue to foster exchanges,
training, and joint exercises. Algeria participates in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism

43 “Algerian Minister Discusses French Ties,” El-Khabar website, October 22, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.
44 As a U.S. Senator, John F. Kennedy expressed support for Algeria’s independence struggle. On July 3, 1962,
Kennedy congratulated Algerians on “the creation of a great new state [which] represents the courageous and devoted
work of the Algerian people and their leaders stretching over many years,” and likened Algeria’s war for independence
to America’s own.
Partnership (TSCTP), a State-Department led interagency program that aims to improve regional governments’ capacity and coordination to counter violent extremism, but Algeria prefers bilateral activities with the United States that recognize its regional importance. As part of TSCTP, U.S. Special Forces train, equip, and aid national forces in fighting the AQIM in southern Algeria and the Sahel. U.S. intelligence also is shared.\footnote{Mhand Berkouk, \textit{U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror}, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2009.} For their part, Algerian authorities have shared information regarding terrorists of Algerian origin with the United States. To support Algeria’s efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed leaders of AQIM, including Droukdel, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Algeria also participates in the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and in NATO naval exercises.

On September 29, 2009, a U.S. State Department spokesman said that “Al Qaeda in North Africa (sic) gave us an opportunity to boost our ties with Algeria” because “the presence of militant groups represents a common challenge for both of us.” Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman made his first visit to Algeria in October 2010 and saluted the country as “an important voice” with “a great role to play in keeping peace in Africa.” With reference to Algeria’s sensitivities, he stated that the United States “respects the sovereignty of the countries of the region and its commitment in the fight against terrorism did not replace that of the countries concerned.” With regard to counterterrorism, Feltman said, “We support Algeria’s leadership in this operation, in particular as regards the plan adopted at the last Tamanrasset meeting…. Our intention is not to replace the countries of the region. We are merely worried about the stability of these countries.”\footnote{“US Assistant Secretary Discusses US-Algerian ties, Counter-terrorism,” \textit{Liberté} website, October 22, 2010, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.}

After meeting President Bouteflika in November 2009, General William E. Ward, head of the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), reportedly told the Algerians that the United States is determined “to strengthen and improve bilateral relations and work closely with Algeria in several areas related to our mutual interests in security cooperation,” including the fight against violent extremism. He also acknowledged Algeria’s regional power and ambition, stating, “we appreciate Algeria’s leadership in dealing with regional questions related to security and the fight against terrorism.” Ward said that “terrorist and criminal activities in the Maghreb and the Sahel region remain a threat to the entire region and beyond it…. If the countries of the region have decided to organize themselves, it means that they are aware of the proper measure of the threat. We share their assessment of the situation and we support their efforts to secure and stabilize the Sahel.”\footnote{“AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,” \textit{Liberté}, November 26, 2009, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.} On a visit to Algeria in July 2010, U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin echoed the tribute to his hosts, saying “We appreciate Algerian efforts in the fight against terrorism, both in North Africa and the Sahel region or elsewhere, and we are very grateful.”\footnote{“AFRICOM Commander Says No US Bases to be Set Up in Algeria,” \textit{El Watan} website, November 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.} He also reassured the Algerians that Washington did not want to intervene directly in the Sahel, but preferred to provide technical, intelligence, and political support to fight Al Qaeda. Benjamin and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph McMillan later underscored that the United States opposed paying

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\item \footnote{Mhand Berkouk, \textit{U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror}, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2009.}
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\item \footnote{“AFRICOM Commander Strengthens US-Algerian Cooperation in Algiers Visit,” \textit{Liberté}, November 26, 2009, via BBC Monitoring Middle East.}
\item \footnote{“Algeria, ‘Leader’ and ‘Key’ Partner in Fight Against Terrorism,” \textit{Algeria Press Service}, July 27, 2010.}
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ransoms to win the freedom of hostages as part of its “no-concessions policy,” which is the same policy as Algeria’s.49

During a December 2009 visit to Washington to “strengthen the Algerian-U.S. partnership,” Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other officials, and commended Algerian-U.S. cooperation, especially in the military sector, which he described as “very ambitious.” He said that the cooperation included “exchanging information and training human resources.”50

Despite improving ties, Washington and Algiers strongly disagree about some U.S. Middle East policies. Bouteflika condemned the use of force against Iraq and called for the early withdrawal of foreign troops. He criticized U.S. charges against Syria for supporting terrorism and in Lebanon, but Algeria only abstained from voting on a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. Algeria supports the Arab Peace Initiative, which promises full normalization of relations with Israel after it withdraws from Arab lands. It roundly criticized Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009. Algeria considers the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to be the result of ethnic conflict and poverty—not a genocide, as U.S. officials have maintained—and is concerned about its regional implications. In particular, Algeria objects to the International Criminal Court’s warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir because it finds unacceptable a trial of a head of state by an international court and because it believes the warrant impedes a political solution to the Darfur situation.51

In 2010, the Algerian government condemned the inclusion of Algeria on the list of 14 predominantly Muslim countries from which air travelers to the United States were subject to heightened screening in the aftermath of a Nigerian’s failed attempt to bomb an airplane en route from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. Algeria’s ambassador to Washington complained, “This is a burden and discrimination against the citizens of Algeria who do not pose any particular risk to the people of the United States.”52 The Algerian Foreign Ministry presented an official protest on the issue to the U.S. Ambassador in Algiers and remonstrated repeatedly. The United States Department of Homeland Security revised its procedures in April 2010 so that Algeria and other countries are not listed, but their nationals may still be subject to more security checks.

U.S. Investment and Energy Issues

The United States was first to invest in the Algerian hydrocarbon sector after the 2005 liberalization law opened it to foreigners. About 1,100 American citizens live in Algeria, most of whom live and work in the oil and gas fields in the south.53 Economic ties have broadened beyond the energy sector, where most U.S. investment has been made, to financial services, pharmaceuticals, and other industries, although U.S. investors confront many bureaucratic and

51 For background on the ICC’s involvement in Sudan, see CRS Report RL34665, International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, by Alexis Arieff et al.
policy obstacles. Algeria receives duty-free treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In June 2007, Algeria and the United States signed an agreement to cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but other countries, and not the United States, have built or plan to build reactors for Algeria. In June 2010, SONATRACH provided the oil company BP with equipment to help fight pollution caused by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

The State Department’s 2010 Investment Climate Statement on Algeria noted that despite large private sector interest in Algeria, recent government policy trends were relatively unfavorable to foreign investment. The statement concluded:

U.S. firms continue to consider Algeria as an emerging export market that is expected to grow in 2010. However, the climate for U.S. firms considering direct investments in Algeria has worsened, particularly in the wake of a series of restrictive foreign investment rules enacted in 2009. Algeria’s failures to join the WTO or to modernize its banking sector are other factors that have prevented significant foreign investment outside the energy sector. These new investment measures, along with statements by senior leaders critical of foreign investors, reinforce the impression of a government turn in the direction of economic nationalism.54

U.S. Assistance

Algeria receives little development aid from the United States, but benefits from military cooperation and security assistance programs. In FY2009, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense spent $35 million on military-to-military engagement with Algeria. Also in FY2009, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was allocated $2 million for an educational program to counter violent extremism, as part of TSCTP.55 In FY2007, Algeria benefitted from two Defense Department-administered “Section 1206” regional programs.56 Algeria received a portion of a $1.1 million, 7-country regional Section 1206 package labeled as “Partner Nation Intelligence Capability Aid,” and a portion of a separate $5.8 million, 15-country regional maritime security package.

A provision included in annual appropriations legislation—most recently, Section 7086 (c) of the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117, signed into law on December 16, 2009—prohibits certain types of bilateral economic aid and security assistance “for the central government of any country that fails to publicly disclose on an annual basis its national budget, to include income and expenditures.” The restriction may be waived on a country-by-country basis if the Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Jacob Lew signed an FY2010 budget transparency waiver for Algeria on March 25, 2010.57

55 Information provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
57 State Department, “Waiver of Restriction on Assistance to the Central Government of Algeria,” Executive Order 11423, as Amended, Federal Register: March 25, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 57).
Table 1. Selected Bilateral Aid by Account and Type
(in thousands of dollars)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2008</th>
<th>FY2009</th>
<th>FY2010</th>
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<td>710</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>1,798</td>
<td>2,610</td>
<td>2,770</td>
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Source: U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2010-FY2012; figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.

Notes: NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement, IMET = International Military Education and Training, ESF = Economic Support Fund, DA = Development Assistance.

This table does not reflect bilateral assistance appropriated to State Department or USAID regional accounts, nor aid administered by other U.S. agencies such as the Defense Department.

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